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This thesis identifies an emerging problem space, high-rise pyro-terrorism. 
Although modern urban environments are vulnerable to sophisticated arson, and terrorists 
and lone-wolf attackers have exploited that vulnerability, neither practitioners nor 
the academic community have addressed the unique threat posed by arson. This thesis 
fills that gap by showing, first, that a good reason exists to believe that terrorists 
will use arson against high-profile urban targets in the future; second, that existing 
regulatory strategies may be sufficient to guard against accidental fires and 
opportunistic arson, but have weaknesses that sophisticated attackers can identify and 
exploit; and third, that the approach to urban firefighting must be modified to protect 
first responders, improve life safety in cases of pyro-terrorism, and facilitate 
effective collaboration with counter-terrorism forces. This thesis is valuable for an 
academic audience because it identifies the most pressing gaps in the literature on pyro-
terrorism and explains their significance. It is also valuable to practitioners because it 
highlights vulnerabilities that can be addressed immediately, in a proactive rather than a 
reactive way. 
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Pyro-terrorism, the purposeful ignition of fire with the intention of causing harm, 
can make firefighting so complex that it eventually stretches the resources of a 
firefighting department to the limit. The need to preempt terrorist attacks on buildings has 
forced fire departments to create counter-terrorism units on an unprecedented scale. This 
thesis seeks to answer two questions. First, which approaches should fire departments use 
for mitigating, preparing for, and responding to pyro-terrorism occurrences within 
building structures? Second, how should fire departments improve their strategies for 
managing pyro-terrorism events? To get answers to these questions, the thesis draws on 
the relevant literature on the following conceptual themes: how arson is effective as a tool 
for random destruction, how to mitigate fire outbreaks in buildings, and the potential 
weaknesses of the methods used for such mitigation.  
The findings suggest that a major concern in the mitigation of the threat that pyro-
terrorism poses is how to allocate resources and understand the most significant ways in 
which this threat manifests itself. The existing theoretical frameworks do not address the 
needs of counter-terrorism, but it is possible to adapt them for use in counter-terrorism 
contexts. Also, from the findings, it is clear that two principles should guide the 
developers of building codes; building codes are a crucial tool for risk mitigation. First, 
the codes must have narrow tailoring meant to offer protection to buildings facing the 
highest risk, but they should do so without imposing undue needs on other developments. 
Second, building codes should be suitable for not only managing a building’s risk 
exposure but also creating standard features of structure that should remain the same for 
all buildings.  
Tactical responses, too, are a fundamental pillar in addressing the problems facing 
the counter-terrorism units of fire departments; these departments need to explore the 
value of high-rise elevators for immediate response operations. However, the literature 
does not address how counter-terrorism units can manage elevators efficiently when 
evacuation needs to be done on short notice. In addition, the increasing height of high-
rise buildings necessitates making use of elevators for both evacuation and firefighter 
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transportation, which creates a vulnerability to sabotage. The robust safety mechanisms 
for elevators do not seem suited to the challenges facing firefighters in counter-terrorism 
operations. Counter-terrorism units of fire departments also have to contend with the 
reluctance of other security agencies to share intelligence with departments that do not 
play a role in homeland security. The reluctance of other agencies to share information 
with fire departments stems from the potential for that information to leak and undermine 
long-term security strategies. An urgent need exists for a mechanism that allows fire 
departments to obtain specific information about potential terrorist attacks long before 
these attacks occur without undermining the long-term interests of other security 
agencies.  
This thesis recommends that fire departments develop a framework for mapping 
out the risk of pyro-terrorists targeting a building; such a framework should allow 
rigorous cost-benefit analyses and coordination among the various teams managing risks. 
Also, fire departments must cooperate with architects and engineers to develop a 
framework of building codes so that regulators have a mechanism for mapping out 
potential pyro-terrorism risks when they are assessing construction projects. The thesis 
also recommends that industry professionals come up with ways of adapting fire 
chronologies to evaluate the possibilities that a fire incident resulted from pyro terrorism. 
Adapting fire chronologies to locate the potential for terror will help in the development 
of integrated approaches for countering terrorism activities in buildings facing the highest 
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The fire service has long studied, and with reasonable accuracy, predicted and 
responded to incidents of accidental fire and arson, both of which have a set range of 
“standard” characteristics that may be thought of as the “prototypical” fire response 
scenario. Most fires are started accidentally; in those cases, the fire department often 
receives information regarding the event before its arrival. Information en route, such as 
where the fire started, how the fire started, and what is burning, better enables responders 
to prepare and select the appropriate tools and means of suppression. When arson is 
involved, the same general principles apply, even though the fire may have (because of 
multiple ignition points, strategically chosen ignition points, or the use of accelerants) 
developed more significantly before effective fire response can be implemented. 
Moreover, arsons are typically perpetrated during the night hours, when most are asleep, 
which leads to reporting delays and incomplete information (including, for instance, the 
fact that the fire was a case of arson, which is generally not revealed until after the fact). 
Even so, although an arson fire may be more technically demanding or greater in scale 
than an accidental fire, it rarely constitutes a different kind of fire than the accidental fire. 
The arsonist generally does not sabotage fire suppression systems, jam the frequencies 
used by fire departments for on-site communications, or set booby-traps to prevent an 
effective fire response. In sum, fire departments are well equipped to handle arson fires. 
The ability of fire departments to respond effectively to arson is not news, of 
course. Were fire departments not equipped to handle such fires, considerably fewer 
buildings would be dotting the skyline of any major city than there are now. However, a 
distinction can be drawn—and this thesis argues that a distinction must be drawn—
between unsophisticated and sophisticated arson, between arson that has destruction as its 
goal and arson intended to serve some broader political end, between arson that is an 
opportunistic act and arson that is deliberately selected as the best possible means of 
causing deaths, killing or weakening first response organizations, and causing financial 
damage as a means of causing general fear.  
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Certain fires are deliberately ignited with the intent to harm life, and these fires 
fall outside the normal range of a fire emergency response. This type of arson has been 
referred to as pyro-terrorism, or the use of arson to advance a political or social objective 
(a term elaborated upon in Chapter II).1 The Happyland fire in Bronx, New York, in 
March 25, 1990, was intentionally set with the intent to harm by lighting the fire in a 
location that blocked egress from the building, which resulted in 87 deaths.2 This fire was 
not a terrorist attack, although it was a somewhat sophisticated act of arson, and it 
consequently has not received a great deal of attention from experts on terrorism. The Taj 
Mahal Hotel in Mumbai, India, in November 29, 2008, was subjected to a larger 
coordinated terror attack that took 164 lives. The attackers intentionally blew up the 
elevators and set fires on the lower floors to allow deadly smoke to percolate upward 
through the building.3 In this instance as well, the commentary on the attack has mainly 
thought of the Mumbai attack as a terrorist attack that happened to involve the use of fire, 
without considering that this attack was only possible because fire was used. After 
victims were trapped in the hotel, the characteristics of the fire allowed it to be used to 
kill civilians throughout the building without the attackers setting bombs throughout. 
However, the literature does not reflect the emerging threat of which this is a symbol. 
Discussion has still not actually taken place concerning high-rise pyro-terrorism, or 
indeed pyro-terrorism at all. 
When a fire is purposefully ignited to inflict great harm, the complexity of the 
fire-fighting task increases to the point that it may overwhelm the resources of the fire 
department. The pyro-terrorist employs a level of calculation that takes into account two 
central questions (as, of course, every terrorist does). First, the terrorist considers the 
characteristics of a target that make it valuable as a target. For the pyro-terrorist, this 
assessment includes factors like the occupancy of a building, the fuel load, the fire 
                                                 
1 Robert Arthur Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism-The Threat of Arson Induced Forest Fires as a Future Terrorist 
Weapon of Mass Destruction” (master’s thesis, Marine Corps University, 2005), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/ 
tr/fulltext/u2/a509220.pdf. 
2 Richard W. Bukowski and Robert C. Spetzler, “Analysis of the Happyland Social Club Fire with 
Hazard I,” Journal of Fire Protection Engineering 4, no. 4 (November 1, 1992): 117–130. 
3 A. H. Bhandarwar et al., “Surgical Response to the 2008 Mumbai Terror Attack,” The British 
Journal of Surgery 99, no. 3 (March 2012): 368–372. 
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suppression systems both passive and active, the resources of local and nearby fire 
departments, and even traffic patterns. Since this type of fire event is carefully planned 
and executed, it can take advantage of vulnerabilities that may not have revealed 
themselves during less-sophisticated arsons and almost certainly may not become 
obvious during accidental fires, which of course, comprise the overwhelming majority of 
fires that occur. The fire countermeasure systems built into the building (e.g., sprinklers, 
standpipes, annunciator panels, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) are 
likely to be compromised.  
The pyro-terrorist works to sabotage these engineered systems and may ignite the 
fire at a location not readily accessible by responders. Since responders may not 
immediately recognize pyro-terrorism events, they may assume that such systems as 
standpipes are functioning normally. When these systems have been compromised, the 
fire response is impaired; either firefighters will delay their response to find another 
source of water, or they will reach the fire only to discover that they cannot combat it 
effectively because they do not have a water supply. 
A historical study of incidents and open sources of data shows that terrorism 
using arson, in a broad view, tends toward the use of simplistic destructive methods, 
which although they have been proven dangerous, have not been comparable in casualty 
tolls to the damage done by the use of explosives. However, a major concern is that pyro-
terrorism is emerging as its own category of attack and pyro-terrorists are becoming 
sophisticated who take advantage of the unique characteristics of fire as a weapon. 
Malicious groups and individuals have used an increasing number of fires across the 
world.4 The aim of such acts is primarily directed toward driving political and social 
objectives while simultaneously coercing various governments. In the 2010s, the total 
number of incidents of pyro-terrorism has trended upwards and has caused significant 
damage and injuries. Whereas future pyro-terrorist attacks may seem to target city 
                                                 
4 Allan Kahane, Fire with Fire, 1st. ed., stated ed. (Westport, CT: Pyro Publishing, LLC, 2006). 
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centers, the major threat remains to be forested areas.5 Based on the occurrence of such 
attacks, the United States, France, and Israel are ranked as the most probable countries to 
experience pyro-terrorism attacks.6 In Israel, for example, pyro-terrorism has long been 
employed; a 1996 study showed that it was responsible for about one-third of all Israeli 
fires.7 In a report, the chief ranger of the Galilee region in Israel described his own 
experience with fighting arson, saying that fighting it was as challenging as fighting 
conventional terrorism.8 This example simply demonstrates that arson is a viable terrorist 
weapon, and terrorists are likely to become more sophisticated in their use of arson just as 
they have become more sophisticated in their use of other weapons. Consider, by way of 
example, the iterative development of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the Middle 
East. At this point, terrorist organizations have the sophistication necessary to carry out 
highly effective terrorist attacks using homemade explosives. Similarly, it cannot be 
concluded that just because thus far arson terrorist attacks have been relatively 
unsophisticated, they will remain so in the future. It seems likely, in fact, that the 
opposite is true, and that firefighters must be prepared to grapple with this emerging 
threat. 
Before September 11, 2001, the fire service, broadly speaking, was ill-equipped to 
respond effectively to high-rise terrorism events. Following the attacks on the World 
Trade Center, building codes and regulations were changed to improve the resiliency of 
buildings. Improved egress, fireproofing, backup water supplies, and communications are 
now required. Fire department training and standard operating procedures adjusted to 
address the emerging threat. However, even these changes have not prepared fire 
departments to respond to the unique dangers presented by sophisticated pyro-terrorism. 
Although some of the shortcomings of the fire response to acts of terrorism have been 
remedied at least in part, other gaps, including very serious omissions, remain and may 
                                                 
5 Stephen A. Raynis, “Improvised Incendiary Devices Risk Assessment, Threats, Vulnerabilities and 
Consequences” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/ 
2623. 
6 Earl Emerson, Pyro: A Novel of Suspense (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005). 
7 Nurit Kliot, “Forests and Forest Fires in Israel,” International Forest Fires News, no. 15 (1996): 2–6. 
8 Ibid. 
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not reveal themselves in practice until further high-profile pyro-terrorism attacks against 
urban areas occur. By then, clearly, it will be too late. 
For one example of a step in the right direction, consider the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). Homeland Security designed and implemented NIMS, 
which is a system designed to handle large-scale events. The difficulty of managing 
resources increases in proportion with the size of the incident, which presents concerns 
for any large-scale terrorist attack, especially a pyro-terrorism attack.9 NIMS provides a 
framework for maintaining accountability of crews for a given incident. Given the 
numbers and high motivation of terrorists, the fire service must continue to focus its 
attention on the emerging threat of pyro-terrorism. Despite the progress that has been 
made, concerns still exist unique to pyro-terrorism and the threat of sophisticated (as 
opposed to opportunistic) arson that have not been addressed. These topics are discussed 
in this thesis. In general terms, they relate to the possibility that fire counter-measures and 
response strategies will be sabotaged, circumvented, or even exploited by arsonists. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In an attempt to mitigate attacks on buildings, the prevalence of counter-terrorism 
response units within fire departments has increased.10 In light of this trend, how do fire 
departments mitigate, prepare for, and respond to pyro-terrorism events in building 
structures? How should these strategies be improved? 
B. DESIGN 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to identify a new category of terrorist attack 
that is likely to emerge in the near future, a kind of attack against which the targets are 
not protected well (or indeed at all). This kind of attack is high-rise pyro-terrorism. This 
thesis discusses, first, the general concept of pyro-terrorism, and seeks to provide a 
definition of the concept that draws on Baird’s pioneering work on the topic (and the 
                                                 
9 “NIMS Frequently Asked Questions,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, accessed July 28, 
2017, https://www.fema.gov/nims-frequently-asked-questions. 
10 Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism-The Threat of Arson Induced Forest Fires as a Future Terrorist Weapon of 
Mass Destruction.” 
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work of others as well) to arrive at a definition consistent with the usage of the term in 
the literature and means something more than just “terrorism that happens to involve 
fire.” By drawing a parallel between pyro-terrorism and cyber-terrorism, the author 
provides such a definition. Pyro-terrorism is terrorism that depends on the unique 
characteristics and capabilities of arson as a method of attack that enables attacks against 
targets that may not otherwise be so vulnerable or enable attacks to succeed that 
otherwise may have been intercepted by existing countermeasures. The parallel to cyber-
terrorism should of course be obvious. Cyber-terrorism is terrorism that depends on the 
unique characteristics of the Internet, which facilitates entirely new kinds of attacks.  
Although this thesis identifies future threats rather than confining itself to 
discussing attacks that have already occurred or attack modalities that have already 
proven effective when employed by terrorists, it is no work of imaginative fiction. Quite 
the contrary; it builds on existing literature discussing the use of arson in terrorism, and 
discussing arson and terrorism more generally to build a cohesive and well-sourced case 
for the importance of addressing pyro-terrorism as an emerging threat. This analysis 
proceeds in three parts. First, it is established that a gap exists in the literature concerning 
the plausibility or possibility of pyro-terrorism against high-rise buildings. Although it is 
perilously difficult to prove a negative, this thesis provides some assistance in this regard. 
The author points to the pioneering work of Baird, and to other scholars identifying his 
work as pioneering, to prove that pyro-terrorism—to say nothing of the specific category 
of high-rise pyro-terrorism—has not yet been explored. This analysis continues further. 
The author surveys work that has been done on terroristic arson, which is not quite the 
same as pyro-terrorism. He concludes, as suggested earlier, that pyro-terrorism as he has 
defined it has not yet really occurred, at least not as a weapon against high-rise buildings, 
and that a gap can be found in the literature as to the possibility of its use. 
This thesis is thus situated firmly within the literature as a speculative work 
identifying future threats. To state so is not, as some suggest, is to say that it is useless or 
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even counterproductive.11 Quite the contrary, terrorists are aware of the potential that 
pyro-terrorism holds (at least, some kinds of pyro-terrorism), and that they have simply 
avoided using it to any great extent thus far. Even though pyro-terrorism against urban 
targets has not been discussed by terrorist organizers, nor has it yet been employed to 
great effect by organized terrorist groups, it remains the case that it is not likely to be 
news to terrorists, and can only serve to improve the status quo of laxity rather than to 
expose this nation to a new threat. To understand why this is the case, it is only necessary 
to consider the perspective of a terrorist seeking a new attack vector vis-à-vis the 
perspective of an agency seeking to prevent it. The terrorists, it seems, have a lower 
standard for taking action. They require that their target sound plausible rather than a 
certain success. To see proof, look no further than the enormous number of terrorists who 
fail to attain their objective (often dying) or, even more often, are foiled before they leave 
the planning stage. The frequency of such failures does not appear to have dissuaded 
others from following in their footsteps. Terrorists, then, do not need a master’s thesis to 
inspire an attack; it is enough that others have carried out similar attacks before (e.g., the 
Korean subway attack). 
The agency, by contrast, has a limited budget, the resources with which to carry 
out cost-benefit analyses, and an obligation to maximize the effectiveness of its budget, 
an obligation that demands that resources be allocated only to proven threats, or at least 
to possibilities for which a very strong argument can be made. Thus, such an agency 
demands something more than just the existence of prior similar attacks; it demands a 
coherent and well-sourced argument that a pressing vulnerability exists in need of 
protection. To argue another way, to suggest that the sort of thesis that this author has 
written aids terrorists is to suggest either that nobody has ever used fire to cause mass 
civilian casualties in urban environments (which has been previously shown to be utterly 
false) or else to suggest that terrorists are more motivated by the current state of academic 
literature than they are by past examples of attacks that they can find with little effort. 
Alternatively, to suggest that theses like this one are unhelpful is to suggest that security 
                                                 
11 Dallas Boyd, “Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-Restraint,” Homeland Security 
Affairs 7, no. 1 (2011), http://search.proquest.com/openview/29273935064a3138f13d2859f28a4af2/1?pq-
origsite=gscholar&cbl=1336360. 
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agencies have such a robust internal mechanism for identifying future threats that they 
are already aware of attack modalities like the one discussed in this thesis, and as such, 
the only purpose the thesis can possibly serve is to alert attackers to a new potential 
weapon. However, this concept is plainly false, as is seen from so-called “failures of the 
imagination” that lead to successful terrorist attacks like the 9/11 hijackings. 
This thesis is valuable, ultimately, because it identifies an attack method that can 
very plausibly be employed by terrorists; an attack method that has not thus far been 
guarded against in any systematic way. Where efforts have been made to guard against 
arson, this thesis discusses why those efforts may not suffice to prevent sophisticated 
attackers from successfully completing a planned attack. Most of those efforts, as has 
been discussed, focus on the prevention of arson and accidental fires rather than on the 
prevention of deliberate attacks calculated to overcome passive and even active 
countermeasures. This scenario, of course, is rather like trying to prevent hijackings by 
making sure that planes do not spontaneously fall out of the sky and that passengers 
cannot suborn the flight crew by yelling loudly at them. As the 9/11 hijackings showed, 
countermeasures that may be sufficient to discourage an opportunist are in many cases 
barely an inconvenience to a determined attacker, especially an attacker willing to risk or 
abandon his own life in the completion of an attack. 
In addition to discussing the inadequacy of some current efforts to guard against 
arson, this thesis examines the current state of the literature and provides very thorough 
coverage of topics relevant to the overall question of high-rise pyro-terrorism for two 
reasons. First, the academic community thus far has neglected the threat identified in this 
thesis. As a result, a cohesive body of literature about high-rise pyro-terrorism (or even 
about pyro-terrorism, apart from a few outliers) can definitely provide the academic 
reader or the practitioner with an understanding of the topic sufficient to engage with the 
recommendations and concerns presented in this thesis. The central contribution of this 
thesis to the academic conversation concerning pyro-terrorism is to identify a new 
category—high-rise pyro-terrorism—and draw on rich bodies of scholarly literature 
relating to fire safety in general, the tactical mitigation of high-rise fires, the historic 
relationship between arson and pyro-terrorism, the potential for sabotage that overcomes 
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passive fire countermeasures, and so on to allow those rich bodies of literature to serve a 
supporting role in the development of this new topic. 
This thesis uses data sources in the area of pyro-terrorism, building construction 
and design, fire suppression systems, and emergency response. The literature examining 
pyro-terrorism specifically is very sparse, which is itself a problem and also poses 
challenges for this literature review. Consequently, this thesis integrates the literature that 
currently exists regarding the use of arson as a tool for terrorism and unmotivated, 
unprincipled destruction, the literature on the mitigation of building fires (especially 
arson) and the vulnerabilities and deficiencies of technologies and methodologies used 
for that mitigation, and the literature on tactical mitigation of high-rise fires and 
especially terroristic high-rise fires (insofar as such literature exists). Where necessary, 
literature that sets out a general point about fire safety unrelated to terrorism is 
supplemented with literature that relates specifically to terrorism but does not examine 
fire safety in an attempt to synthesize the two. A review of publications and studies in the 
area of building construction and design provides greater insight into mitigation design. 
This literature review also provides information that can be applied by emergency 
responders to understand the threat of pyro-terrorism and to develop appropriate 
responses.  
The intended contribution of this research is that it synthesizes information from a 
wide range of fields. This approach allows a thesis based on secondary data sources to 
contribute substantially still to the literature by hollowing out an entirely new topic out of 
the existing literature. The scope of this study is limited to the study of fire-related 
terrorism. Literature related to fire, building safety, terrorism, and the potential for arson 
as a terrorist weapon are all considered. By understanding the nature and the risk of pyro-
terrorism, it is possible to draw conclusions that may be useful in improving high-rise and 
emergency responder safety. The boundaries of this study are the investigations of pyro-
terrorism use as a weapon of terror.  
This literature-oriented approach also provides insight into pyro-terrorism, 
specifically related to the use of fires as weapons. Concerning information retrieved from 
past occurrences of such attacks, this thesis offers a holistic framework that expands the 
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countermeasures taken to address this kind of threat.12 The approach adopted in this 
thesis is a qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis of the problem of pyro-terrorism. 
Based on the information evaluated in the chapters, this thesis provides practical 
recommendations about the most important factors affecting life safety and the economic 
damage that arsonists may be able to inflict. These recommendations include the 
identification of building materials or fire countermeasures especially vulnerable to 
sabotage and the use of alternative building methods or else a level of redundancy that 
can prevent sabotage from being effective, the use of communications methods robust 
enough to survive jamming attempts and network saturation, and the development of a 
framework within which first responders can coordinate with intelligence agencies to 
facilitate the sharing of sensitive information without compromising successful 
counterterrorism efforts. The author believes that practitioners should implement these 
recommendations immediately while the literature catches up to this emerging threat by 
exploring other ways of mitigating pyro-terrorism. Each chapter also identifies gaps in 
the literature suitable to serve as a guide to academic engagement with this topic. 
C. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II describes the historical and modern distinction between arson, as a 
relatively unprincipled act of destruction, and pyro-terrorism, as the reasoned use of fire 
as a political weapon. The chapter examines the history of arson as a weapon of terrorists 
and describes the distinction between terrorism that happens to involve arson and genuine 
pyro-terrorism. The former category describes the majority of terrorist arson that has 
occurred thus far, which is explained by the nature of arson as the weapon of choice of 
opportunists (not requiring the expertise to build bombs or anything of that nature; in 
other words, everyone can burn a house down, but it takes time and skill to blow it up). 
This chapter also explores the extent to which pyro-terrorism is a new category 
previously undescribed in the literature, concluding that it is in fact a new category that 
has not been adequately explored previously. In addition to this theoretical work, the 
chapter also discusses the reasons to believe that arson, as a specific weapon employed 
                                                 
12 Peter Lance, 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—The Untold Story 
(New York: HarperCollins e-books, 2009), loc. 77 of 560, Kindle.  
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for calculated reasons against urban targets, is likely to become a serious threat in the 
coming years. It explores past attacks that were not properly terrorist incidents but 
nevertheless demonstrated the capabilities of an attacker who notices a vulnerability in a 
high-density area and used fire as a weapon to exploit that vulnerability. 
Chapter III describes the historical evolution of fire safety codes as they relate to 
resistance to intentional, as opposed to accidental, fire damage. It also discusses how this 
evolution has and ought to continue further in the face of pyro-terrorism as distinct from 
arson. The guiding principle of this chapter is the division of codes into two categories, 
prescriptive and performance-based. The position best supported by the literature is that 
prescriptive codes are inefficient and may actually encourage suboptimal design where 
technology has advanced enough to allow greater safety using new methods. The chapter 
advocates for a hybrid performance-prescription code that sets out performance standards 
significantly higher than the current status quo, but allows as an alternative that new 
developments adhere to a set of relatively standard prescriptions. This chapter then 
proceeds to discuss the ways that new technological advancements affect resistance to 
pyro-terrorism, and how current ways of evaluating fire safety may not be adequate for 
describing the threat posed by a determined and sophisticated arsonist. It also describes 
some general concerns related to the construction of buildings to resist fire, like the use of 
timber in high-rise buildings and the potential exposure to sabotage that certain kinds of 
insulated panel have.  
Chapter IV discusses the historical evolution of fire response procedures, the 
current state of the art as it relates to high-rise fires, and how those procedures have 
changed and ought to change to respond to the threat of arson that targets the emergency 
responders. Some of the author’s concern is with the basic structure of the fire 
department, and whether the risk of pyro-terrorism suggests that increasing standards of 
professional capability may need to be imposed on firefighters in high-risk areas, but his 
main concerns are tactical and not organizational. He explores in some detail, for 
instance, the methods by which firefighters can secure lines of tactical communications in 
the face of sabotage or simple overuse (as may be the case even when a terrorist does not 
set out to overwhelm communications lines). He also discusses the problem of 
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information sharing between fire departments and other departments, especially those 
with sensitive counter-terrorism information. A somewhat odd question that nevertheless 
is cause for significant worry, in the author’s opinion, is the use of high-speed elevators 
for high-rise evacuation. On its face, it seems like a good idea, notwithstanding the fact 
that it goes counter to the prevailing wisdom. However, as this chapter discusses, 
although such a strategy may be successful in the ordinary case of high-rise fires, it may 
also be vulnerable to disruption or even exploitation by attackers. 
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II. PYRO-TERRORISM AND ARSON 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the historical development of arson and 
pyro-terrorism. Since pyro-terrorism is an emerging term that has not yet seen a great 
deal of examination and scholarly engagement, it still does not have a consensus 
definition. The difficulty of separating ordinary violence from terrorism is exacerbated in 
the case of pyro-terrorism. In the absence of an explicit endorsement of an act of arson by 
a terrorist group, or contextual clues indicating overwhelmingly a relationship between 
the act of arson and a political goal served by the creation of terror, it may be impossible 
to tell whether a particular attack is pyro-terrorism or “mere” arson. Similar difficulties 
arise in demarcating the line between arson and pyro-terrorism. 
A discussion of the history and development of pyro-terrorism and its distinctions 
from the use of arson in simple interpersonal violence, property destruction, and 
especially political sabotage is beneficial in the following chapters when discussing 
regulatory and tactical mitigation of pyro-terrorism. Thus, this chapter begins by 
discussing the distinction between terrorism and violence generally, because such a 
distinction serves as the foundation for any distinction between pyro-terrorism and arson. 
This chapter then addresses the historical emergence of pyro-terrorism as a distinct 
category of arson, using contrasting cases of politically motivated arsons that were not 
acts of terrorism to highlight the distinctions between arson and pyro-terrorism. The bulk 
of this discussion specifically focuses on the history of pyro-terrorism. Also of interest 
are cases in which pyro-terrorism may have been used but was not, and on what those 
cases may reveal about the circumstances under which pyro-terrorism may be used. 
This chapter then proceeds to a discussion of emerging concerns about pyro-
terrorism. Such concerns primarily revolve around the possibility that pyro-terrorism 
represents a distinct category of terrorism (akin to cyberterrorism in that regard) with its 
own set of vulnerabilities and requiring its own countermeasures. Thus, far, discussion of 
pyro-terrorism as a distinct emerging threat has focused on the possibility of arson-caused 
wildfires; however, much of this discussion proves relevant to the author’s broader thesis 
concerning pyro-terrorism in high-rise buildings. Another emerging concern examined in 
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this chapter is the possibility of terrorist attacks targeting first responders. The challenges 
associated with identifying early on a case of pyro-terrorism (which is much more 
difficult than identifying terrorism in a case in which, for example, an explosive is used) 
make first responders to arson in high-rise buildings acutely vulnerable to such attacks.  
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TERRORISM AND VIOLENCE 
In general, terrorism is distinguished from ordinary violence in several ways, 
which are relatively uncontroversial. This thesis draws on a RAND Corporation report by 
Brian Jenkins on the definitional challenges to the study of terrorism.13 Although an 
accepted definition of terrorism suitable for rigid legal application is not yet available, 
and unanimity on what constitutes terrorism and what does not is also not yet defined, 
widespread agreement has been reached on what qualities are “terrorism-esque.” In other 
words, terrorism is much like Justice Stewart’s infamous reasoning in an obscenity case, 
there may be no single accepted definition, but one knows it when one sees it.  
First, terrorism is motivated by political concerns.14 This criterion may pose some 
challenges considering that “the personal is political,” and that no interpersonal 
interactions occur without a political dimension, but it is a criterion that becomes clearer 
considering paradigmatic cases of terrorism and not-terrorism. Where an act of violence 
is part of a larger pattern of violent acts addressed to a faceless and generalizable group, 
for instance, it seems uncontroversial that it is terrorism even if it is motivated in part by 
interpersonal hostility (for instance, if any of the church arsons described in this chapter 
were carried out in part because the arsonist had a personal dislike for members of the 
church he burned). Where an ideological conflict or bigoted hatred merely serves as the 
backdrop for a purely interpersonal and individualized conflict, as may occur when a 
racist, motivated by racist concerns of blood purity, murders an interracial couple, this 
event is generally called a hate crime instead of an act of terrorism. This distinction 
                                                 
13 Brian Michael Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems (Santa Monica: RAND, 
1980), http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA103363; Cástor Miguel Díaz-Barrado, “The Definition of 
Terrorism and International Law,” in International Legal Dimension of Terrorism, ed. Pablo Antonio 
Fernández-Sánchez (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 27–42. 
14 Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems. 
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becomes easier to understand when it is considered in the context of other factors, like the 
provocation of publicity. 
The second factor characteristic of terroristic violence is that it is carried out 
against civilians.15 Two things are important to keep in mind. First, “civilians” are 
defined very broadly to include government officials, even law enforcement officers. 
Second, the inclusion of military or political targets does not prevent an attack from being 
considered an act of terrorism, so long as it was designed to cause a large number of 
civilian casualties. The 9/11 hijacking that targeted the Pentagon comes to mind. Even 
taken in isolation, such a hijacking would unquestionably be an act of terrorism because 
of the deaths of the civilians on the plane; had the attack on the Pentagon also used a 
truck bomb or unoccupied plane, it would instead be more akin to an act of guerilla 
warfare, being an attack on a military target with at most incidental civilian casualties. 
Further, terrorist attacks are intended to provoke maximum publicity.16 This goal 
dovetails with the final and probably defining criteria that terrorist violence is intended to 
create fear. To elicit fear and project an image of strength, terrorists seek to cause deaths 
and destruction in an attention-attracting way, whether through the use of unusual 
methods (for instance, the Japanese sarin gas attacks), attacking high-profile targets (for 
instance, the 9/11 hijackings), or the infliction of a significant number of casualties (the 
Oklahoma City bombing).17  
Finally, terrorist attacks are intended to provoke fear—usually fear of the terrorist, 
who often claims responsibility publicly—that has impacts far greater than the act 
itself.18 The relative magnitude of the fear created as opposed to the tangible impacts of 
the violence is most important. Terrorism is an archetypical strategy of a materially weak 
                                                 
15 Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems; Brian Michael Jenkins, “New Challenges 
to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts: An Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat,” CT-377 Testimony to 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 11 (2013), https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/ 
Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=261142. 
16 Jenkins, The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems. 
17 Yasufumi Asai and Jeffrey L. Arnold, “Terrorism in Japan,” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 18, 
no. 2 (April 2003): 106–114. 
18 Ibid. 
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organization; it is propagandistic political warfare. Were it otherwise, the organization 
could use more conventional means to achieve its goals. An entity like Al Qaeda could 
never cause enough physical damage in the United States to alter seriously the American 
way of life. The fear created by terrorism consequently serves as a sort of force 
multiplier; the uncertainty created in citizens of the targeted city, state, or country makes 
up for the material weakness of the terrorist.19 Terrorist attacks are intended to overstate 
the strength of the terrorist group to create the fear that further attacks cannot be 
prevented. 
B. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PYRO-TERRORISM OUT OF 
ARSON 
Many of the scholars relied on in this portion of the chapter do not use the term 
“pyro-terrorism” to describe arson employed to terroristic ends, but such a delineation is 
not essential for the purpose of this section. What is important, rather, is understanding 
the circumstances under which the label of terrorism is appropriate for an act of arson. 
1. The History of Arson 
Arson—even for political ends—of course has a history that goes beyond the 
recognition of its utility for terrorism. For a very long period of human history, fire was 
the most destructive force that man could harness, and was so employed in warfare, in 
interpersonal disputes, and for political violence. However, arson is not often marked by 
the qualities, discussed previously, that distinguish violence from terrorism. 
In many cases, arson is simply a lower-risk, less impressive, and consequently, 
“less aggressive” alternative to bombing, and although it is often politically motivated, it 
is consequently less likely to be part of a coherent campaign of terror.20 Arson is less 
risky for the arsonist for a number of reasons. The materials with which arson is 
accomplished are readily available. They are so readily available, in fact, that it is 
                                                 
19 Asai and Arnold, “Terrorism in Japan,” 106–114; Peter Gordon et al., “The Economic Impacts of a 
Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Commercial Aviation System,” Risk Analysis: An Official Publication of the 
Society for Risk Analysis 27, no. 3 (June 1, 2007): 505–512. 
20 Albert A. Stahel, “Switzerland: Terrorism and Its Control,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 
4 (December 1, 1992): 206–209. 
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actually impossible to determine who has access to the materials necessary to commit 
arson. Almost every adult, simply by virtue of having an automobile, has a great deal of 
gasoline available at a moment’s notice; moreover, a napalm-like sticky fuel can be 
produced by the addition of polystyrene to gasoline.21 No special expertise is required to 
produce fuel-soaked rags or even Molotov cocktails; nor are these weapons 
conspicuously criminal as are homemade explosive devices; nor do inexperienced 
arsonists expose themselves to great risk in producing the materials needed for the arson.  
Even a significant arson will generally not inspire as much fear as a comparably 
destructive explosive attack. Fire, as a destructive force, is one that most adults are 
intimately familiar with and understand its risks and are also aware of the existence of a 
response force proficient in mitigating those risks. Moreover, the fact that a fire is the 
result of arson is not ordinarily obvious to observers until the fire has been resolved and 
carefully investigated. The immediate gut impact of a bombing is not present. For these 
reasons, arson is likely to be used in apolitical violence sprees, far more so than is 
bombing.22  
Even where attacks are clearly political, against civilian targets, and intended to 
create publicity, it has been argued that many cases of political arson, even as part of a 
concerted campaign, are not terrorism but mere sabotage.23 Apologists for the Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF), for instance, commonly use this argument. Beginning in 
approximately 1980, the United Kingdom was plagued by fire-bombings by the ALF.24 
The campaign, broadly understood, was plainly terroristic. Executives of companies that 
the ALF had targeted were visited in their homes and threats were made against their 
families; products tested on animals were poisoned. The ALF has used extensive fire 
                                                 
21 John Pike, “Napalm,” Global Security.org, accessed August 14, 2017, http://www.globalsecurity. 
org/military/systems/munitions/napalm.htm. 
22 Pekka Santtila, Katarina Fritzon, and Anna Lena Tamelander, “Linking Arson Incidents on the 
Basis of Crime Scene Behavior,” Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology 19, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 1–
16. 
23 David Thomas Sumner and Lisa M. Weidman, “Eco-Terrorism or Eco-Tage: An Argument for the 
Proper Frame,” ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 20, no. 4 (December 1, 
2013): 855–876. 
24 Rachel Monaghan, “Not Quite Terrorism: Animal Rights Extremism in the United Kingdom,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 11 (November 1, 2013): 933–951. 
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bombings against civilian targets that it believed contributed to the exploitation and 
torture of animals. However, these arsons were generally calculated so as not to 
jeopardize human life.25 For this reason, although the ALF has committed acts of 
terrorism, the arsons themselves probably should not be understood as terroristic.  
Similarly, with respect to the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), arson has often been a 
precursor to genuine terrorism rather than terrorism itself.26 Beginning in about 1996, the 
ELF has used arson as part of its portfolio of violent tactics, although the suitability of the 
term “terrorism” is disputed.27 For theorists advancing the position that terrorism is an 
inapposite term, the critical differentiator between sabotage and terrorism is that sabotage 
is not intended to harm human lives, whereas terrorism is.28 Although this definition may 
not be tenable with respect to terrorism more broadly, the common use of arson in 
destructive sprees, sabotage, and even insurance fraud, suggests that this thesis should 
adopt such a distinction.  
2. The History of Pyro-terrorism 
Arson has never been understood as a phenomenon separate from terrorism; it has 
never been the case that an act can be either arson or terrorism, but not both.29 Rather, the 
possibility that arson can be a method used in terrorism has been considered since long 
before pyro-terrorism began to be analyzed as a discrete topic with a distinct name.30 
Generally speaking, political arson has been considered distinct from pyro-terrorism in 
                                                 
25 Monaghan, “Not Quite Terrorism: Animal Rights Extremism in the United Kingdom,” 933–951. 
26 Gary A. Ackerman, “Beyond Arson? A Threat Assessment of the Earth Liberation Front,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 143–170. 
27 Stefan H. Leader and Peter Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (2003): 37–58, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/ 
09546550390449872. 
28 David Thomas Sumner and Lisa M. Weidman, “Eco-Terrorism or Eco-Tage: An Argument for the 
Proper Frame,” ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment 20, no. 4 (December 1, 
2013): 855–876. 
29 Kadir Akyuz and Todd Armstrong, “Understanding the Sociostructural Correlates of Terrorism in 
Turkey,” International Criminal Justice Review 21, no. 2 (May 12, 2011): 135. 
30 Robert Arthur Baird, “Pyro-Terrorism—The Threat of Arson-Induced Forest Fires as a Future 
Terrorist Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 5 (August 1, 2006): 415–
428. 
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cases where it is not employed as part of a broader campaign of terror or in which it is not 
intended to jeopardize human life. This section turns from considering cases in which the 
moniker of pyro-terrorism is inappropriate to cases in which it is warranted. 
a. Opportunistic Pyro-Terrorism 
The American South in the 1990s saw a spate of hundreds of arsons against 
African-American churches.31 These arsons, insofar as it was possible to identify the 
perpetrators, were often linked directly to white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux 
Klan (KKK); however, they were also often the product of “lone wolves” inspired by the 
trend of arsons to carry out one of their own. However, Black churches were targeted 
with other kinds of violence as well. Bombings were also used, and these arson attacks 
appear to reflect, more than anything else, a predilection of certain terrorist groups to use 
arson as opposed to other means.32 Studies of the church arsons suggest strongly that the 
selection of a particular method of carrying out terrorist attacks is not a purely rational 
one but is rather heavily influenced by socio-cultural context.33 Church arsons were more 
common in areas with an already high arson rate. The contrast between arsons and 
bombings suggests that this effect is not merely the result of some areas having higher 
crime rates than others.34 
A similar example is the rise in seemingly random arson attacks in Germany in 
the 1990s carried out by right-wing nationalists.35 These attacks occurred during a series 
of anti-immigrant riots and widespread violence.36 The arsons were disorganized and 
appeared not to be associated with any concrete political demands or a specific set of 
goals. Although a unifying factor was that the perpetrators were right-wing 
                                                 
31 Sarah A. Soule and Nella Van Dyke, “Black Church Arson in the United States, 1989–1996,” 
Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 4 (January 1, 1999): 724–742. 
32 John P. Bartkowski, Frank M. Howell, and Shu-Chuan Lai, “Spatial Variations in Church Burnings: 
The Social Ecology of Victimized Communities in the South,” Rural Sociology 67, no. 4 (2002): 578–602. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Soule and Van Dyke, “Black Church Arson in the United States, 1989–1996,” 724–742. 
35 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International 
Security 27, no. 3 (January 1, 2003): 40. 
36 Roger Karapin, “Antiminority Riots in Unified Germany: Cultural Conflicts and Mischanneled 
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ethnonationalists, they were not linked by membership in any organization; their 
commonalities were solely ideological. In sum, the attacks were opportunistic, not 
calculated.  
b. Calculated Pyro-Terrorism 
Calculated pyro-terrorism is fire that is selected as the means of violence for 
reasons that are thought-out and relate to the effectiveness of the terrorist attack rather 
than the convenience of carrying out such an attack. The primary marker of “calculation” 
in terrorism is a high degree of commitment to a single attack, or small number of related 
attacks, rather than an ongoing campaign of terror.37 For example, suicide attacks 
generally evince a great degree of calculation because they represent the individuals’ total 
commitment to the cause for which they fight.38 Moreover, attacks that exhibit a high 
degree of planning (the coordination of the Madrid and London bombings; the difficulty 
involved in procuring sarin gas in Tokyo) are quite clearly calculated rather than 
opportunistic.  
The absence of such calculated pyro-terrorism is conspicuous precisely because 
arson is a relatively “safe” form of terrorism for the terrorist.39 When arson is likely to be 
an effective means of causing mass casualties, economic harm, or some other goal, a 
rational terrorist likely prefers arson to other means, like biological terrorism.40 In other 
words, most attacks should be expected that can be committed using fire actually to be 
committed that way. Yet, historically, it has not been the case. Considering major 
terrorist attacks that either have actually occurred and might have been accomplished 
through the use of arson, or that have been proposed but have not been carried out, the 
                                                 
37 Martha Crenshaw, “The Strategic Logic of Terrorism,” in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments 
on Causes of War and Peace, ed. Richard K. Betts (New York: Routledge, 2017): 461.  
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author finds a pronounced preference among terrorists (at least thus far) for other means 
of violence.  
A major example in the former category is the targeting of subway systems in 
Asia using biological weapons. Despite the high vulnerability of subway systems to fire, 
terrorism against subway systems, where it has occurred, has been primarily biological.41 
This point is astonishing considering that arson against subway systems in Asia has been 
an enormously effective form of violence in producing mass casualties.42 In 2003, a lone 
wolf in South Korea filled milk cartons with fuel and set them alight, killing more than a 
hundred people in the Daegu subway. This attack required little preparation or planning 
and required no expertise. By contrast, the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo, although it 
injured thousands, killed only 12.43 In 2004 in Madrid, similarly, subway systems were 
attacked with explosives rather than with arson; killing almost 200, but these blasts were 
coordinated attacks against multiple subway systems rather than a single attack. In 2005 
in London, the coordinated 7/7 bombings targeted the subway and killed 56. A simple 
casualty count is clearly not the be-all end-all of retrospective analysis, but it does 
suggest that the means adopted by the Madrid, London, and Tokyo attackers were not 
inherently more effective than arson.  
It may be protested, with reason, that the Tokyo attackers accomplished far more 
using a novel and terrifying means of violence (biological weapons) than they would 
have through more conventional means. Even granting that this fact is true, still 
remaining is the fact that arson is at least as effective a weapon as sarin or explosives, and 
the puzzle of why it has not been employed against subway systems by terrorists.  
                                                 
41 Mei Xiu-juan, “Study on Fire Scenarios Characteristic for Subway Trunk Arson Simulation Test 
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More generally, large-span commercial buildings are extremely vulnerable to 
arson and are generally densely populated.44 However, they, too, are generally targeted 
by explosive attacks rather than by arson.45 A search of the literature to find arsons 
against shopping malls and other large commercial complexes was fruitless, whereas 
explosive attacks against commercial complexes are relatively common. A Western 
reader may intuit that this result means that fire may not actually be an effective weapon 
in, for example, a shopping mall, but this assumption is incorrect. High-density 
commercial spaces (convention centers, nightclubs, megachurches, malls) are extremely 
vulnerable to fire because of the difficulty of evacuating them and because the efficacy of 
initial response systems like sprinklers has been dramatically overestimated.46 If 
evacuation and containment methods prove insufficient, a review of historical building 
collapses as a result of fire indicates that arson may actually be more effective than 
bombing in producing mass casualties.47 
c. Arson as a Unique Terrorist Strategy 
The second category of surprising data is discussed next. Some attacks can 
theoretically be carried out using arson but not through other, more “traditional,” terrorist 
methods.48 An example is the use of arson to cause forest fires. It seems likely that such 
attacks can be effective.49 Several speculative articles have been published arguing that 
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pyro-terrorism is an under-appreciated threat.50 Most prominent among these is Baird’s 
2006 article, “Pyro-Terrorism—The Threat of Arson-Induced Forest Fires as a Future 
Terrorist Weapon of Mass Destruction.” The thesis of this article, and of follow-up work 
by Deshpande and others, is that wildfires pose the risk of enormous economic damage, 
can be set with comparatively little risk to the terrorist, and require little expertise, 
imagination, or guidance to use effectively. That arson-induced wildfires can cause 
extreme economic damage should be self-evident. Each year, forest fires along the 
American west coast cause enormous financial damage, and those fires are not 
strategically set but rather the accidental product of very dry conditions. The damage 
caused by wildfires strategically set to maximize impact is of course likely to be much 
greater. The threat posed by wildfires deliberately set to cause maximum impact is 
substantial; a wildfire with carefully chosen ignition points can be more than twice as 
damaging as a naturally occurring fire.51 The ease of setting wildfires as opposed to 
carrying out other kinds of terrorist attacks has already been discussed in this chapter, and 
as such, the other points Baird makes in support of his position are not belabored.  
Baird’s article, and others along the same line of thought, has garnered a great 
deal of attention in part because of the significant economic threat posed by wildfires, 
which exceeds that of arson against buildings.52 Mitigating the threat presented by 
wildfires is a key concern for landowners in fire-prone areas, and the seeming 
inevitability of the attack vector that Baird proposes has led to intense speculation about 
the true costs of such terrorism and whether it can be prevented.53 The theoretical 
concerns about pyro-terrorism, which have smoldered since Baird’s pioneering article on 
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the topic, have been ignited by a very real conflagration in Israeli forests, a fire that was 
deliberately started as an act of terrorism against the state.54 Although fire has long been 
a weapon employed by Palestinian militants against Israel, this most recent case has 
served to drive home the argument that pyro-terrorism is likely to become a serious 
aspect of terrorism in the coming years. 
However, despite the ease and potential harms of wildfire arson, anti-American 
terrorists have not adopted this approach.55 A simple desire to cause harm in the ways in 
which a target is most vulnerable strongly suggests so-called “homegrown jihadists” plan 
to use arson to cause wildfires; however, evidence suggests that they have not done so; 
although Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations that have invested in producing 
homegrown jihad have explicitly condoned wildfire arson as an “efficient” form of 
terrorism. Marsden et al. conclude, “those jihadists who do move to physical action are 
not deterred by concerns about taking human life or about personal safety; or to put it 
differently, those with similar sympathies who are so constrained are seldom if ever 
attracted by lower-cost alternatives.”56 
At least one counterexample to the proposition that terrorists have not used 
wildfire arson as a weapon can be presented.57 In Israel, severe wildfires have been 
attributed to Palestinian militants, and these wildfires have caused enormous damage (on 
the order of thousands of homes destroyed). However, patterns of Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict are distinct from patterns of terrorist behavior in other parts of the world, and it 
may be more accurate to describe any Palestinian attacks of this nature as military actions 
rather than as acts of terrorism (not because of any value judgment on the conflict, but 
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rather because of the shooting war between Palestinian militants and the Israeli armed 
forces).58  
d. Patterns of Pyro-Terrorism 
The examples and analysis provided in this section illustrate several salient points, 
both in terms of patterns of terrorist behavior and in terms of the way that pyro-terrorism 
should be structured and understood. The conclusion that seems most strongly supported 
by the former discussion is that pyro-terrorism has thus far been predominantly limited to 
attacks of opportunity as part of disorganized campaigns of terror; where it has been used 
in an organized way, it is at least arguable that its use constitutes sabotage rather than 
actual terrorism. With respect to these arsons of opportunity, the previous examples show 
that the use of arson in terrorism has historically been associated with the use of arson in 
“ordinary” crimes. Arson in terrorism is associated strongly with the same factors that 
have made it comparatively less popular as a means of terroristic destruction; the lower 
level of commitment required, the easier availability of the means to commit arson, and 
the less impressive nature of even high-profile arsons. The result has historically been 
that the use of arson in terrorism is not very different from apolitical arsons: sporadic, 
heavily motivated by cultural factors, relatively low-casualty, and difficult to detect and 
prevent.  
With respect to calculated terrorism rather than opportunistic terrorism, the 
contrast between arson and other forms of terrorism is revealing. Two conclusions can be 
drawn from this contrast. The first is that arson is not likely to become a method 
employed by “serious” terrorists, and that planning to protect buildings from the efforts 
of determined and sophisticated arsonists may be a waste of time. The second is that 
arson, when chosen as a method for terroristic violence, is chosen based on non-rational 
social factors, factors that may in time come to favor the use of arson for calculated acts 
of terror, as well as opportunistic ones. This latter interpretation is more plausible for 
several reasons. First, even when arson is used for opportunistic terror, it is associated 
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with the general rate of arson in the surrounding area.59 This tendency suggests that 
social factors beyond just the ease of carrying out arson make it more popular among 
relatively low-commitment and disorganized terrorists and more popular in some areas 
than others. Second, whether Palestinian wildfire arsons are classified as terrorism or 
military action, such arsons will likely serve as an example to other terrorists, at least 
Islamic terrorists, and provide a reason to believe that some terrorist groups will at least 
consider the use of arson in a calculated attack. 
What the author concludes about the historical patterns of pyro-terrorism, 
therefore, is that it has thus far not developed into the distinct category of terrorism that 
some commentators believe it will likely be.60 Rather, arson has been one of many tools 
employed by terrorists, generally in arsons of opportunity rather than as the means chosen 
to carry out a carefully planned attack. However, the reasons for the comparatively low 
use of arson in calculated attacks do not suggest that its use will continue to be neglected 
by terrorists. Arson may be comparatively less emotionally impactful than the use of 
explosives, for example. It also may enable individual terrorists or terrorist cells to carry 
out multiple attacks before being neutralized, which makes them perhaps more damaging 
than had explosives been used.  
3. Emerging Concerns 
This section examines two new concerns that have not been thoroughly addressed 
in the literature. The first of these concerns is the use of pyro-terrorism not just as one of 
many ways by which a terrorist attack can be carried out but rather as a distinctive kind 
of terrorism. Arson enables the kinds of attacks not possible using other methods, and 
these kinds of attacks are not adequately protected against by countermeasures targeted at 
conventional terrorism. The literature has thus far concentrated on the potential use of 
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arson as a means of causing forest fires, but other possibilities exist. The second 
emerging concern is the targeting of first responders by terrorists. The literature on this 
topic has primarily focused on the use of explosives in terrorism; however, as this section 
shows, once the probability of a rise in pyro-terrorism is acknowledged, the concerns 
raised about the targeting of first responders with explosives must be extended to pyro-
terrorism. 
a. Pyro-Terrorism as a Distinctive Category of Attack 
The literature on pyro-terrorism has thus far been concerned with the possibility 
of using wildfires as a weapon. However, the broader point underlying fears of pyro-
terrorism and forest fires has not yet been appreciated. The threat of “forest jihad” is real, 
but it is not the only threat posed by terroristic arson.61 Equally concerning—and perhaps 
more likely to be realized—is the possibility that terrorists will take note of the serious 
vulnerabilities that certain high-profile urban targets have to fire and exploit those 
vulnerabilities. Many hypothetical scenarios present themselves, any of which is at least 
as plausible as the possibility of terrorists using forest fires as a weapon. 
Consider one plausible hypothetical example of how a terrorist attack may take 
advantage of the unique characteristics of arson, as compared to other forms of attack, to 
reduce the risk to the individual terrorists and potentially even increase the casualty count 
above what can be produced using explosives or biological agents. Imagine an arson 
attack on a high-rise building that begins with a fire in a location where fires may occur 
without antagonistic action. Such locations include kitchens, breaker rooms, and 
essentially any high-traffic area. In a very tall building, evacuation is generally 
understood to be impossible, so such buildings are intended to “burn out” rather than be 
contained or extinguished. Consequently, emergency response in such a scenario would 
be predicated on the assumption that the fire would ultimately burn itself out, and that it 
was not necessary to mount rescue operations. 
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Strategically placed accelerants or delayed-action fire-bombs, though, could 
prevent burnout from occurring quickly enough to prevent partial or total collapse of the 
high-rise. Even worse, the existence of those accelerants would not become obvious until 
they began to take effect. Occupants and responders who had been acting under the 
assumption that the fire would burn itself out—an assumption developed based on 
models of accidental fires rather than intentionally set fires designed to cause mass 
casualties or structural instability—would be ill-situated to respond to such a 
development. Consider the likely actions of inhabitants of such a building if they 
retreated to fire-resistant vestibules, consistent with standard procedure in buildings 
where evacuation is difficult or impossible.62 They would have no way of knowing that 
the fire had continued for longer than was expected, and would likely not perceive the 
need to change strategies and seek to evacuate. Moreover, by retreating to a fire-resistant 
vestibule, they might actually have put themselves in a position that would prevent later 
evacuation without assistance. In such a scenario, the likelihood of mass casualties is 
very high. 
b. Terrorist Attacks Targeting First Responders 
When attacks that cause significant damage also greatly harm the organizations 
responsible for responding to such attacks, they greatly enhance their effectiveness at 
creating fear and reduce the ability of the local government to respond to those attacks 
and future attacks. These attacks may actually be even more effective at causing 
paralyzing fear within first responder organizations than within the general population.63 
First responder psychological recovery is a key question both because first responders are 
likely to suffer exceptional psychological trauma in responding to a mass casualty event 
and because when first responders are impaired, they become less able to mitigate the 
harms of future attacks.  
                                                 
62 Chung-Hwei Su, Kuang-Chung Tsai, and Mu-Yuan Xu, “Computational Analysis on the 
Performance of Smoke Exhaust Systems in Small Vestibules of High-Rise Buildings,” Journal of Building 
Performance Simulation 8, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 239–252. 
63 Sara Garrido and John Nicoletti, “First Responder Psychological Recovery Following a Mass 
Casualty Event,” in Police Psychology and Its Growing Impact on Modern Law Enforcement, ed. Cary L. 
Mitchell and Edrick H. Dorian (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2017), 143–157. 
 29
The targeting of first responders by terrorists has therefore been a topic of some 
concern. In suicide bombings and other similar attacks, a “second wave” of bombs is 
often timed to target first responders.64 A bomb is detonated in some populated area, 
perhaps a shopping mall or a crowded intersection. Other bombs are set in the 
surrounding area and timed to detonate at an interval sufficient to ensure that medical and 
law enforcement personnel are on the scene providing care and restoring order. These 
second-wave bombs, although generally causing fewer casualties due to the reduction in 
victim density in the area, do cause harm that is of very high strategic value. In addition 
to the “ordinary” psychological trauma associated with responding to a mass casualty 
event, first-responders targeted by such attacks also must cope with the anxiety of 
believing they themselves may be under attack while responding. Moreover, they must 
additionally cope with the loss of their comrades who have been injured or killed by 
terrorist attacks targeting first responders. 
The psychological effects of such attacks can be divided into at least three kinds. 
The first is the general psychological trauma discussed previously, which may contribute 
to lower first responder effectiveness and otherwise generally serve the goal of terrorists 
to cause as much fear and anxiety as possible. The second is the fear and anxiety induced 
that focuses on responding to terrorist attacks. Such fear and anxiety seems likely to 
reduce the effectiveness of first responders in responding to such attacks, which allows 
terrorists to inflict greater casualties because of the reduced effectiveness of the medical 
response. The third is the inefficiency introduced into emergency response procedures as 
a result of the necessity of avoiding exposure to second-wave attacks. By way of 
example, rescue and treatment of the wounded may not be able to progress until law 
enforcement has arrived and secured the area. In this way, even where a terrorist has not 
planned a second-wave attack, the possibility of such an attack enhances the effectiveness 
of the first explosion. 
Perhaps because of the enormous proliferation of terrorism in the Middle East, 
and because that terrorism so often involves explosives rather than arson, much of the 
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literature concerning attacks targeting first responders has focused on bombings.65 
However, there is no reason to believe that terrorist attacks using arson may not target 
first responders as well. By way of example, imagine a hypothetical case intended to lure 
first responders into a conflagration on an elevated floor that they could not easily retreat 
from and could not fight effectively. 
The sophisticated terrorist would sabotage the elevators and water distribution 
system within a high-rise building to prevent easy entrance and exit and also ensure that 
efforts to fight a fire once on-scene met with failure. In such a scenario, a firefighter team 
would likely be forced to climb the stairs to the fire rather than wait for the elevators to 
be fixed, and fatigue would diminish their ability to protect themselves and act rationally 
once confronted by the fire. The difficulty of establishing water flow when the in-
building system has been sabotaged would potentially leave the firefighters, once on-
scene, without water for a significant period of time and force them to either retreat back 
down the stairs or else expose themselves to dangerous heat. Exacerbating the risks such 
a scenario poses is the plausibility of a partial or total collapse of the high-rise in such a 
scenario.  
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III. CODES AND REGULATION MITIGATION 
This chapter examines the potential of building safety codes to mitigate the risks 
posed by pyro-terrorism. It begins by discussing the principles of fire safety codes and 
their two main categories. It then discusses the historical development of those codes 
with particular emphasis on both the evidence supporting their necessity and on their 
weaknesses. After this discussion, it proceeds to examine the issues that an ideally 
designed building safety code addresses in the interests of preventing vulnerability to 
pyro-terrorism. 
The worst-case scenario in any high-rise fire is if that fire leads to a failure of 
structural integrity, which is true both in economic and in human safety terms. 
Economically, a complete failure of structural integrity leaves the property owner with an 
enormous amount of work to do to restore the building; generally, it must be rebuilt from 
the ground up, and any support structures left standing need to be demolished and 
removed, with new supports installed. In terms of life safety, which is the focus of the 
present analysis, collapse jeopardizes those who are ordinarily safe from fire and smoke 
damage alone. Individuals, who have retreated into fireproof vestibules, although not 
harmed by the fire itself, will not likely survive the collapse of their building. Firefighters 
on the scene, although they are insulated from the high temperatures of the fire, have no 
special protection to allow them to survive a collapse. Furthermore, collapse spreads the 
danger beyond the building itself. Debris may be scattered beyond the footprint of the 
building, posing a hazard to anyone it may collide with and making the ground 
surrounding the building dangerous to navigate.66 Particulate matter, for instance 
crumbling concrete, may also contribute to long-term adverse health consequences in the 
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surrounding area, to say nothing of the potential harms if the building still uses asbestos 
insulation.67 
A major concern in preserving structural integrity in high-rises is preventing a 
localized collapse from turning into a progressive collapse.68 Local collapses are very 
difficult to guard against. Even in buildings in which a fire of any realistic intensity is 
expected to burn out quickly, single sides of the building, or small groups of rooms, may 
be exposed to heat extreme enough to cause a local collapse. Even though so-called 
“long-cool” fires present the greatest potential for catastrophic failure in high-rise 
buildings,69 a short fire of sufficient intensity may also produce a structural failure. It 
seems likely that design strategies that presume the inevitability of local collapse are 
superior.70  
Accepting the nigh-impossibility of completely preventing local collapse, the 
challenge for the engineer is to prevent a local collapse from developing into a complete 
collapse. It is not difficult to see how such a disaster can occur. Consider the case of a 30-
floor building that experiences a local failure; the collapse of the westward portion of its 
27th and 28th floors. Such a collapse may easily develop into a more serious local or 
complete collapse in a number of ways. First, the westward portion of floor 26 (and 
presumably lower floors as well) may collapse under the additional weight of floors 27 
and 28 once they are no longer anchored to their support structure. Assuming this 
collapse does not occur, floors 26 and below may collapse anyway if the westward 
portions of floors 29 and 30, unsupported from below, fall onto the collapsed portion. 
Collapse may occur in other ways as well—for instance, the eastward portions of the top 
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floors may collapse eastward once the westward portions of those floors no longer 
balance the floor—but this hypothesis is intended solely to underscore the point that a 
local collapse (which is not possible to guard against perfectly) can easily develop into a 
more serious one. A key regulatory requirement, therefore, is redundancy and robustness 
such that local failures caused by heat will not spread throughout the building. 
Statistical analyses of past arsons suggest that arson fires are significantly more 
damaging than ordinary fires.71 Where arson and especially pyro-terrorism are deemed 
especially likely, greater fire resistance is necessary. Conversely, if pyro-terrorism is not 
likely, the additional structural resilience and fire resistance that this chapter suggests is 
necessary is prohibitively expensive and is consequently not desirable. In light of the 
importance of allocating resources efficiently, and not for maximum safety, the need for 
pyro-terrorism risk assessments like those described in the previous chapter becomes 
clear.  
A. BUILDING SAFETY CODES 
Building safety codes are prescriptive or performance-based codes for the 
construction of new buildings. They can apply to all types of construction or to specific 
types (e.g., often, specific requirements apply especially to tall buildings, but not to all 
buildings).72 Prescriptive codes, which are the earlier of the two kinds of building safety 
codes, are codes that focus on specific regulations assumed to be the best way to 
accomplish the goal in furtherance of which the code was established. By way of 
example, suppose that a code is intended to reduce the vulnerability of buildings to 
earthquakes. Those responsible for developing a prescriptive code determine, based on 
their experience or on tests funded specifically for the purpose of code development, how 
best (or most efficiently) to mitigate the risk of earthquake damage to buildings. They 
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then draft a code requiring all buildings constructed under the code to adopt the 
prescribed method of construction (or, more often, one of a range of acceptable methods 
of construction). They might say, for instance, that any building over a certain height 
must either have a pendulum damper or else adopt a tiered design preventing the 
building’s center of gravity from ever traveling over the footprint of its base.  
Performance-based codes are those that do not prescribe specific methods, but do 
set out goals that all buildings constructed under the code must achieve. Compliance of a 
particular design with the performance requirements of a code is generally assessed by 
computer modelling, but not always. The compliance of particular materials with 
performance requirements can often be assessed through experimentation rather than 
modelling; in many cases, moreover, a particular design for an entire structure must be 
tested (either at a small scale or full scale) to satisfy the requirements of the performance-
based code. Continuing the example of an earthquake safety code, such a performance-
based code may require that the building be capable of withstanding an earthquake of 
magnitude 7 with epicenter 500 yards from the building’s foundation. How this 
performance goal was accomplished, perhaps using a pendulum or hydraulic shock 
absorbers or space-age materials, is at the discretion of the designer. 
As a practical matter, building codes are increasingly adopting a hybrid 
approach.73 A blended prescriptive-performance approach minimizes the risk that some 
innovative building design will be adopted based on an incorrect performance model, but 
also allows designers and engineers flexibility in using new materials or new designs to 
mitigate risks more effectively or efficiently than previously possible. 
a. The Evolution of Safety Codes 
Perhaps, the first Western fire safety code was established in 1666, in response to 
the Great London Fire.74 King Charles declared that “no man whatsoever shal presume to 
                                                 
73 Hadjisophocleous, Benichou, and Tamim, “Literature Review of Performance-Based Fire Codes 
and Design Environment.” 
74 Graham Spinardi, Luke Bisby, and Jose Torero, “A Review of Sociological Issues in Fire Safety 
Regulation,” Fire Technology 53, no. 3 (2017): 1011–1037, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/ 
s10694-016-0615-1. 
 35
erect any House or Building, great or small, but of Brick or Stone, and if any man shal do 
the contrary, the next Magistrate shal forthwith cause it to be pulled down,” and that “all 
other eminent and notorious Streets, shal be of such a breadth, as may with Gods blessing 
prevent the mischief that one side may suffer if the other be on fire.”75 Fascinatingly, this 
code is a hybrid prescriptive-performance code. It mandates a particular material for the 
construction of all buildings under the code, but does not mandate a particular street 
width, saying instead that they must be wide enough to prevent the spread of fire. A street 
lined with carpenters’ workshops and sawmills would (at least if such considerations 
were taken into account by the magistrates) therefore need to be wider than one lined 
with breweries and stonecutters. It is beyond the scope of this section to consider how 
this code was actually applied, but the flexibility of the prescriptive approach is important 
to note. 
Another point to take from the early English fire safety code is that the 
implementation of safety codes generally follows the demonstration of a serious 
vulnerability, whether that demonstration takes the form of scholarly analysis or actual 
disaster. In countries among the first to industrialize, disaster has usually been the 
precipitating factor leading to the implementation of safety codes.76 The Triangle 
Shirtwaist fire, which occurred in New York City in 1911, is an obvious case. In the 
Triangle Shirtwaist factory, exits were blocked during working hours to prevent workers 
from stealing some of the shirts that they produced (which was apparently a serious 
concern at the time, and not an uncommon occurrence). As a result, when the factory 
caught fire, the workers in the factory were unable to escape. More than a hundred 
workers died, and the political reaction was swift. Commercial buildings were soon 
required to have a sufficient number of accessible and always unlocked exits to be used 
in case of fire.  
A more recent example is that of China, which has industrialized at a speed far 
outstripping the speed of any Western nation. This rapid development has created severe 
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systemic vulnerabilities. For instance, because of the enormous population density in 
major Chinese cities, extremely large and high-traffic buildings are the norm in China. 
Consequently, a risk has been acknowledged of catastrophic fire in large commercial 
complexes, and robust fire codes, which prescribe methods for assessing the fire risk a 
structure poses, the maximum fire load that a structure can permissibly pose, and required 
methods of evacuation (among other factors) have been developed to prevent those 
vulnerabilities from leading to disaster.77  
b. The Need for Safety Codes 
From an economics perspective, it can be unprofitable for a building owner to 
pursue the greatest possible level of life safety in his building design.78 Computer 
modelling has revealed a strong disincentive on the part of building owners to build safer 
structures than the minimum required. In isolation, it may potentially be tolerated, as 
individuals with a higher risk tolerance may choose to live and work in less safe, but less 
expensive, buildings. However, the risks posed by buildings burning out of control are 
the paradigmatic example of an externality; something that is not “priced in” for the 
person making a given decision.79 A burning building imposes severe negative 
externalities on both the city in which the building is located (which must provide fire 
services, but generally does not tax based on a building’s level of fire-resistance), and 
especially adjacent buildings, which have no say in whether they are exposed to flames 
pouring from the windows of the building next door. Since the costs of unsafe structures 
are not fully borne by the party selecting the design for a structure, an economic analysis 
of the question suggests that the state should intervene either by taxing unsafe structures 
or by outlawing them.80  
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More generally, structural analysis of various administrative agencies and their 
interactions with building designers has revealed that so-called “disconnected actors” can 
be disastrous for efficiently allocating resources towards fire mitigation and prevention.81 
The problem of effective decision making with respect to fire safety is so complicated 
that not only is it difficult for individual building owners to make safe decisions, even 
where they are motivated to do so; governmental agencies themselves also experience 
difficulty evaluating and weighing risks. 
From a sociological perspective, fire safety regulation prevents safety from being 
beholden solely to the profit motive, democratizing fire safety, and giving even those 
with little economic power a say in their own security.82 That is, fire safety codes and 
similar regulations have historically corresponded to the interests of politically powerful 
groups. Of course, some very poor individuals cannot afford any housing at all but may 
be able to do so if safety codes did not drive up the cost of that housing.83 It is tempting 
to suggest that fire safety codes should prioritize protection over price, but one of the key 
insights that a sociological investigation of such codes holds is that to make that decision 
can further disempower the poor.  
B. PRESCRIPTIVE AND PERFORMANCE-BASED CODES 
The necessity for fire safety codes has long been acknowledged and has more 
recently been shown rigorously. Until recently, however, modern building safety codes 
were almost entirely prescriptive rather than performance-based.84 These codes generally 
did not have the effect of preventing fires. In fact, they may actually have increased the 
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risk of fire relative to simply allowing building owners to accept whatever risk level they 
preferred, as prescriptive codes were not only expensive but also at times out of date.85  
Hadjisophocleous, Benichou, and Tamim also present several challenges on 
principle to prescriptive codes.86 First, prescriptive codes rely on requirements rather 
than on objectives, which is problematic because requirements are only an indirect and 
imperfect way of accomplishing the desired outcome (increasing fire safety).87 By 
presenting a rigid set of building requirements, and not providing some flexibility to 
ensure that those objectives are met, prescriptive codes pose the double risk of not 
accomplishing those objectives in some cases, and being inefficient in others.88 Imagine 
that Louisiana adopted a building safety code with the goal of mitigating the dangers 
posed by storm surges. Such a code would be highly applicable to some buildings (those 
within the potential area covered by a storm surge), but would be entirely unnecessary for 
others. If such a code specified construction methods (e.g., building on stilts), then many 
buildings would be exposed to greater costs without justification. If, however, a 
performance-based measure was adopted (e.g., that the building must be elevated to at 
least two feet above the area’s highest recorded storm surge), then only those buildings 
that needed to be built differently would be affected by the code—a more efficient 
outcome. 
Second, prescriptive codes have historically not considered cost adequately in 
large part because of the previous criticism.89 As prescriptive codes are outcome-blind, 
they generally do not make exceptions for protection that is almost as good and far 
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cheaper (nor, actually, do they make exceptions for both better and cheaper protection).90 
Even in situations in which a particular prescribed method is unreasonably expensive, 
that method still needs to be applied because exceptions are generally not permitted under 
prescriptive codes. 
Third and finally, prescriptive codes stifle innovation.91 This aspect of 
prescriptive codes is perhaps the most unfortunate in the long term. The justification for 
prescriptive codes in the face of ongoing innovation that makes those codes obsolete is 
that they are updated once new technologies mature and are shown to have the claimed 
advantages over more established designs. However, prescriptive codes greatly reduce 
the incentive to take part in the development of innovative designs and technologies, 
because those technologies cannot be implemented in the areas covered by prescriptive 
codes.92  
Purely prescriptive codes do have one significant advantage, however; methods 
for estimating the performance of developing fire-safety technologies can prove 
inaccurate.93 The only perfectly accurate way of determining a building’s resistance to 
fire is actually to set it alight. By way of example, imagine a sprinkler head that is able to 
distribute more water, and with greater regularity in patterns of distribution, than previous 
designs. Suppose that this sprinkler head has a tendency to malfunction in extremely 
humid environments, but all testing is conducted in Arizona or some other dry area. It 
only becomes apparent in actual practice that this sprinkler design does not live up to its 
theoretical performance. In this way, innovation—even careful innovation—can at times 
create riskier structures than intended. 
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C. HYBRID FIRE SAFETY CODES 
This section of the chapter discusses key considerations for regulatory mitigation 
of the risk of pyro-terrorism and also examines the methodological shift in regulatory 
approaches to fire safety. This shift, which is critical to understanding what regulations 
can do to mitigate the risk of pyro-terrorism, is discussed in the first sub-section. Some of 
the key concerns that arise in evaluating the level of safety to fire damage that a given 
high-rise structure has are discussed next. The main concerns discussed in this thesis are 
the preservation of structural integrity in the face of fire, the effectiveness of automatic 
mitigation systems, and the feasibility of independent or firefighter-assisted evacuation. 
The next sub-section examines sustainability concerns, and the review then turns to the 
special challenges of regulatory mitigation of pyro-terrorism, as distinct from ordinary 
fire.  
A hybrid code contains elements of both prescriptive and performance-based 
codes; for instance, it may say that support structures may be composed of a particular 
sort of steel column; but if they are not composed of that sort of column, they must 
demonstrate a particular level of stability and heat resistance. Such a code encourages 
innovation while at the same time ensuring that performance does not fall below a 
minimum standard. Due to the availability of a specific, pre-approved construction 
method, the performance standards for other methods can be higher than they strictly 
need to be, reducing the likelihood that an error in predicting performance can result in 
disaster. Based on the sensitivity of developers to profitability and the minimization of 
costs, the author argues that even when safety requirements are raised for non-standard 
approaches, innovation is still encouraged by the possibility that a new method may 
prove cheaper than established technologies and designs. 
A concern that applies not just to prescriptive codes but also to performance-
based codes is the preservation of transparency and the elimination of so-called “magic 
numbers.”94 Magic numbers are elements of a regulation the source of which is not made 
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clear in the regulation or its supplemental materials. These numbers generally “were 
developed according to the best information available at the time, sometimes informed by 
experimental studies, often involving some degree of experience or engineering 
judgment, or in some cases simply to standardize products (such as door sizes).”95 An 
example of the applicability of this concept to performance-based fire safety codes is as 
follows. Many safety codes prescribe a certain interval of fire resistance (commonly 60 or 
90 minutes) that is generally chosen to allow for complete evacuation of the building. 
Over time, however, evacuation methods will likely become more effective and the 
amount of time necessary for complete evacuation will likely decrease. To encourage 
responsiveness in regulatory codes to these developments, the method by which the 
“magic number” representing fire resistance time was selected should be made 
transparent. 
Even within performance-based codes, great variation occurs as to how 
performance is assessed. The so-called “prescriptive” method (which is referred to as the 
traditional method) is that a particular construction material or design must be tested 
using physical testing, and the more modern method allows for the use of computer 
simulation.96 Thus, a hybrid approach has been suggested, in which the component being 
tested is exposed to a physical test, while in parallel a building constructed using that 
component is simulated using computer modelling, adjusting its simulation to account for 
any unexpected results from the physical test. This approach has several advantages. 
First, the costs of computer modelling are far less significant than the costs of physical 
testing, so the traditional approach does not significantly raise costs.97 Second, by 
simulating the performance of the entire structure rather than just evaluating the 
component’s adherence to rigid, parametric performance standards, the hybrid method of 
evaluation allows for the assumptions of the regulation (e.g., that a particular kind of 
deformation does not lead to collapse) to be checked. Third, because the required 
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physical tests are still conducted, the hybrid method of evaluation will not lead to less 
accurate results than the traditional method of evaluation. Fourth and finally, because 
physical tests are conducted, the accuracy of computer modelling is enhanced; just as the 
use of computer models allows the tester to check the assumptions of regulators, so too 
does the use of physical testing that allows the testers to check the assumptions of their 
computer model.98 
1. Effectiveness of Mitigation and Evacuation 
A major concern is that fire mitigation systems and materials often do not 
practically live up to their theoretical effectiveness.99 One example is fire-retardant 
insulation.100 Polystyrene insulated panels are a commonly used construction material. 
They consist of a polystyrene core attached to a thin metal skin, which retains the panel 
and provides structure. These panels are highly effective and cost-effective insulators, 
and are consequently used in many structures. They also are theoretically fire-resistant 
and are generally considered not to add significantly to the energy available to a fire. 
However, these theoretical conclusions are dependent on a number of assumptions that 
may not hold up in practice; for instance, on the ability of the fasteners of the panels to 
remain attached even when exposed to heat. When the panels fall into a fire, and 
especially when the metal skin of the panels is broken, they contribute to the fire’s 
growth rather than inhibit it.  
Incidentally, the vulnerability of these insulated panels is a fantastic example of 
the concerns raised earlier Sabotage may inhibit the effectiveness of fire mitigation 
systems, which allows a sophisticated arsonist or pyro-terrorist to inflict greater harm 
than projections suggest. Since the metal skin of these insulated panels is so thin, it can 
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be damaged inadvertently or (more worryingly) deliberately, and this damage can be 
done unobtrusively and by someone with only brief access to the panels in question.  
Fire safety protocols that do not ensure the ability of inhabitants to protect 
themselves are suspect. When automatic measures fail—and they often do—individual 
action to evacuate or otherwise protect oneself is a measure of last resort.101 One critique 
of measures of evacuation safety (like the required safe egress time) is that especially in 
high-rise buildings, an individual agency is not taken seriously, which leads to measures 
that do not truly show whether a building is evacuable.102 Babrauskas et al. argue that the 
metric commonly used to ensure that a building can be safely evacuated, the ratio of 
required safe egress time to available safe egress time (or RSET/ASET) does not consider 
how individuals actually behave when evacuated from buildings in the case of fire or 
similar disasters. RSET is calculated under the assumption that evacuees will proceed 
robotically to the nearest exit upon receiving the instruction to evacuate. This inaccurate 
assumption can be especially dangerous where unexpected circumstances (for instance, a 
greater fire intensity than projected that can caused by a terrorist attack) reduce the ASET 
by accelerating the spread of fire or the collapse of the structure.103 
More generally, the fire-fighting task can in many contexts become impossible in 
tall buildings because of the difficulty of reaching the fire and evacuating inhabitants.104 
Individuals on the 40th floor of a burning building, for instance, cannot rely on firefighter 
rescue, nor can firefighters count on being able to reach the top floors of such a tall 
building in time to prevent its destruction.105 Such buildings rely on burnout—the 
process by which the fire extinguishes itself as it encounters fuel that does not produce 
enough heat to sustain the fire—rather than on active fire-fighting measures. However, 
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the safety of this decision is questionable in light of the material addressed previously 
about the potential failures of fire mitigation systems. The determination that a fire will 
burn itself out is made based on the availability of fuel. If the fuel availability is below 
the amount the fire needs to sustain itself, the fire will inevitably burn out. However, the 
fuel availability calculations that these determinations rely on may themselves be 
inaccurate, as the previous discussion of insulated panels shows. 
2. Sustainability and Fire Mitigation 
One example of a trend in high-rise construction with the potential to make high-
rises more safe or less safe, depending on how it is approached, is the use of novel, more 
sustainable materials. The use of timber for high-rise construction is growing more 
popular and will likely continue to do so.106 This usage is obviously a cause for some 
concern, as wood is known for being a very combustible construction material. However, 
it is not necessarily the case that timber construction of high-rise buildings will make 
those buildings less fire-resistant. 
In the case of timber supports for high-rises, a useful analogy can be drawn 
concerning the aforementioned insulated panels discussed previously. For high-rise 
buildings, partial or complete encapsulation of combustible building elements has long 
been recommended.107 The goal of encapsulation is to prevent any combustible elements 
from being exposed to oxygen and heat, which allows them to burn and contribute to the 
fire’s spread. In the case of insulated panels, this encapsulation takes the form of a very 
thin metal lamination. Recent research suggests that some laminated timber supports may 
be self-encapsulating, and that heavy timber frames may be sufficiently fire-resistant to 
be usable without other encapsulation.108 Sufficiently thick laminated timber frames, 
when exposed to fire, will develop a thick layer of char that does not easily flake off the 
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remaining wood. This layer of char prevents the remaining unburnt timber from being 
exposed to oxygen; moreover, the char is an excellent insulator that prevents the core of 
the timber frame from being exposed to sufficient heat to cause warping or a loss of 
structural integrity. 
Such timber frames are disanalogous to insulated panels in a key way; since the 
timber frames are inherently self-encapsulating, they are not as vulnerable to sabotage as 
insulated panels and other combustible materials that must be manually encapsulated to 
prevent them from contributing to building fires. An arsonist seeking to sabotage the 
previously described insulated panels could puncture the metal laminate covering them. 
An arsonist seeking to sabotage timber supports does not have the same option. This 
finding serves as an excellent example of one principle that the author draws from his 
review of the literature on regulatory mitigation of pyro-terrorism, sabotage resistance. 
Consideration of a design’s ordinary characteristics is insufficient to establish whether it 
is vulnerable to pyro-terrorism. An adequate analysis considers not just the level of 
vulnerability under optimal conditions but also the level of vulnerability when the 
attacker has had some level of prior access to the structure and has been able to sabotage 
it.  
However, timber frames may be vulnerable to arson in another way. When fires 
of a sufficiently high intensity are set, laminated timber can act to intensify rather than 
retard its spread.109 When the laminate that holds layers of timber together fails as a 
result of high heat, these layers fall apart, which prevents the encapsulation of lower 
layers and adds to the available fuel. This is not to say, necessarily, that laminated timber 
is unsuitable for buildings at high risk of arson or pyro-terrorism; rather, it is intended to 
highlight the importance of considering the worst possible scenarios for a given structure, 
component, or material to have a complete picture of a building’s fire-resistance. 
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D. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ARSON AND PYRO-TERRORISM 
Even more so than when evaluating a structure’s resistance to ordinary fires, a key 
consideration for mitigating the risk of arson, and especially pyro-terrorism, is structural 
robustness.110 Due to the extraordinary harms of high-rise collapse discussed previously, 
a natural goal of pyro-terrorists targeting tall buildings is to induce partial or total 
collapse. They will often be able to produce the conditions necessary for at least a 
localized structural failure, so structural redundancy and alternate load pathways are 
necessary to ensure continued structural integrity. It should not be difficult to understand 
the reason. A hallmark of intentional, as opposed to accidental, fires is that they occur in 
circumstances more conducive to major damage. For example, an intentional fire 
generally involves the use of accelerants intended to increase the heat of the fire, which 
causes some materials that may ordinarily subtract from the available fuel to instead 
contribute to the fire. 
By way of example, consider the laminated timber discussed earlier, which is in 
most cases, reasonably fire-retardant. Under ordinary circumstances—that is, when a fire 
is of an intensity that can reasonably be expected from an accidental fire—laminated 
timber does not catch fire as supposed. The outer layers of the timber do char but are held 
to the beam by the lamination, which prevents oxygen from reaching unburnt wood and 
acting as an insulator. Through the use of accelerants, however, a fire can be set that is 
hot enough to cause delamination that exposes deeper layers of the timber and causes the 
timber support to catch fire exactly as can be expected of untreated timber. Similarly, the 
laminated insulating panels described previously can be sabotaged in one room or one 
region of a building, which causes them to contribute to the growth of a fire. Since an 
arsonist is often able to defeat passive countermeasures like lamination, which produced 
very intense flames, it is impossible to be confident that an arsonist is not able to cause at 
least a local collapse. What is essential, therefore, is designing structures with sufficient 
robustness that a local collapse is not likely to progress into a complete collapse.  
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A special question that arises with respect to code mitigation of the threat posed 
by pyro-terrorism is resource allocation and the identification of likely targets. Some 
buildings are not likely to be targeted by a pyro-terrorist, any more than they are likely to 
be targeted for a bombing or a mass shooting. This is not to say that a pyro-terrorism 
event is unlikely to occur, at, for example, an ordinary apartment complex that is not 
politically significant, but it is to say rather that if the risk of an attack is deemed so low 
that it is not worth it to install on-site security personnel or metal detectors to protect 
against more conventional terrorist attacks, it may not be worth imposing strict building 
safety requirements to protect against pyro-terrorism.  
At least one general consideration with respect to resource allocation and target 
prioritization presents itself. Multi-function buildings are at an especially high risk for 
arson, to include pyro-terrorism.111 Terrorists are generally at best indifferent to collateral 
damage inflicted—sometimes they prefer collateral damage, and sometimes, they simply 
do not care whether collateral damage occurs or not, so long as their target is destroyed—
which means that a multi-purpose building that houses a target of significance to the 
terrorist is likely to be no less valuable a target than a single-function building. 
Exceptions do occur, of course (for instance, the Oklahoma City bomber chose to avoid 
targets that would have a great number of casualties unaffiliated with the government)112 
but those exceptions are just that, exceptions. Suppose that a very naive analysis of 
terrorism vulnerability to each structure is applied, which reduces the measure of 
vulnerability to the question of whether a target is located in the structure that a terrorist 
likely wants to attack. It should be clear that multi-function buildings come out far worse 
than single-function buildings in this analysis. The problem however is more significant 
than that since multi-function buildings are likely to present a wider range of 
vulnerabilities (as the number of persons admitted to the building is far greater than in a 
single-person building), expose a wider range of potential victims (which may be relevant 
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in assessing the potential psychological impact of an act of terrorism), and have a greater 
absolute number of victims. 
A related concern also arises of assessing whether special precautions are 
necessary to protect against pyro-terrorism while a building is under construction, which 
for several reasons is when they are most vulnerable.113 First, many of the more critical 
fire countermeasures (smoke alarms, automatic sprinkler systems, and so on) are not 
installed, or else are not operational, until a very late stage in the life cycle of a 
construction project. Second, the lower level of traffic in and around a building under 
construction makes it less likely that an arsonist is observed and intercepted before a fire 
can be set. Third, many of the more flammable components of a building are directly 
exposed while it is under construction. Consider the flammable insulation panels 
described previously: those ordinarily are hidden behind drywall and generally 
inaccessible, which prevents an attacker from easily accessing them to damage them. 
While a structure is under construction, however, those panels are far more likely to be 
exposed and (consequently) vulnerable. 
With that said, it seems unlikely that special steps need to be taken during 
construction to guard against pyro-terrorism, since many of the factors that have made 
pyro-terrorism generally less appealing to terrorists apply with even greater force in the 
case of buildings under construction. First, the destruction of a building that has not yet 
been completed does not send a strong message of the terrorist group’s power, nor is it 
likely to inflict fear in the minds of many.114 A person who witnesses the destruction of a 
completed high-rise might plausibly think, “I could have been in that building;” while a 
person who witnesses the destruction of an incomplete building likely does think this 
way. Second, the destruction of an under-construction building is not likely to impose 
anything like the economic damage that a completed building does. Consider the 
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destruction of an office complex, which of course is an enormous cost to the insurers of 
the office building. However, it also is a major cost to the countless businesses whose 
operations are disrupted by the need to relocate, the possibility of destroyed data or 
critical materials, and the potential deaths of key employees. By contrast, the destruction 
of a building that has not yet begun to be used harms only the building’s owners, or at 
least their insurers. 
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IV. TACTICAL MITIGATION OF PYRO-TERRORISM 
It is largely the special challenges of firefighting in dense cities that has driven 
innovation and increased focus on training and drill. City fires are larger; they have more 
places to expand, and more fuel nearby. City fires are also more dangerous and 
destructive. The populations of cities are greater with more valuable things. Thus, the 
development of structured fire departments, and then the development of specific training 
regimens, and the increasing focus on formal education for leadership, has roughly 
tracked the development of the metropolis (hence, e.g., the earlier development of 
firefighting professionalism in London than in the United States, where for some time, 
London could not be rivaled in size, density, or affluence).  
Therefore, the increasing challenges posed by high-rise fires as high-rises become 
ever larger and ever more enticing targets for arsonists are likely to impose special 
demands on firefighters, who likely must adjust their organization, their technological 
solutions, and even their tactical approach to firefighting to accommodate these special 
needs. Historically, the challenges imposed by increasingly dense development have led 
to the most serious fires—witness, for instance, the Great Fire of Edinburgh—and have 
made fires more difficult to fight, requiring new technologies and ways of organizing fire 
response (for instance, it is difficult in the modern era to appreciate fully how great the 
metropolitan fire risk can be if not for the emergence of constant, nearly omnipresent 
water access in every building).115 High-rise buildings, as the culmination of a general 
trend towards denser buildings (and denser populations inhabiting those buildings), 
require still more advanced fire-fighting techniques. 
A. COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION 
The modern approach to firefighting—especially in urban areas—focuses on 
communication and coordination.116 For one thing, firefighting entails a number of 
                                                 
115 Ewen, Fighting Fires: Creating the British Fire Service, 1800–1978 (Berlin, Germany: Springer, 
2009), 34. 
116 James S. Angle et al., Firefighting Strategies and Tactics (Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett 
Publishers, 2013), 86. 
 52
distinct but related tasks: the evacuation of persons vulnerable to the fire who cannot 
evacuate under their own power, coordination between the fire department and other first 
responders, the provision of immediate lifesaving care before medical personnel arrive, 
instruction of and response to bystanders and their needs, and of course, extinguishing or 
at least controlling the fire. This last task itself has numerous divisible components, from 
entering burning rooms to extinguish from within to supplying water to cool such rooms 
from outside, to performing support activities like monitoring and maintaining hose 
connections.117 The divisibility of the firefighting task thus leads to a heightened 
emphasis on communications and coordination. 
For another thing, the potential risk posed by fires has increased dramatically, as 
has the magnitude of related problems that firefighters must address. In a word, more 
materials are available to burn. The increasing density of modern living—in buildings 
made of a surprising proportion of flammable material—means that a fire of a given size 
will put many more lives at risk than in earlier years. This increase in the scope of the 
firefighting task necessitates a greater number of firefighters responding to serious 
incidents than in the earlier days of the development of firefighting. The adage that too 
many cooks spoil the broth is not quite true in this case, but the principle it reflects—that 
confusion and wasted effort multiplies as additional workers join any effort—certainly is. 
To mitigate this confusion and to ensure that the addition of more firefighters to any 
given task is efficient, communication is paramount. 
Such communication has, of course, developed over time. The first form of on-
site communication used by firefighters was in-person communication (“John, go around 
to the back of the house”), no doubt supplemented with the use of runners to relay 
information (“Jim, go around to the back of the house and tell John he needs to move 
south”).118 These methods of firefighter communication are still important today, 
especially face-to-face communication between persons who are on-site but not inside the 
building. Sign language may also be used to coordinate while firefighters are wearing 
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protective gear that prevents their words from being heard. Even so, it should be clear 
that such solutions are not adequate for modern firefighting. In the modern firefighting 
context, on-site coordinators are generally not within the building that is on fire (and 
certainly are not at the site of the burning itself), putting them at an extreme physical 
remove from those with whom they need to communicate. Moreover, many firefighters 
need to communicate with the on-site coordinator, and what one firefighter has to say 
does impact what the coordinator tells another firefighter to do. 
Two natural solutions present themselves, both of which have been adopted by 
modern fire departments, the use of electronic communication to enable instant contact 
and the use of pre-composed plans so that instant contact is not necessary for the 
coordinator to know what the firefighters are doing.119 Each has its own set of 
weaknesses, of course. Electronic systems can fail, and if they can fail, they are most 
likely to do so at times of high stress; for instance, when they are exposed to the heat and 
smoke of a major fire. Particulate matter in the air can be particularly problematic for 
electronic systems, as can network saturation caused by an unexpectedly large fire 
necessitating more firefighters than was planned for. Pre-written plans are only as good 
as the information on which they are based, and no information is perfect. The modern 
fire department therefore is likely to use a hybrid system in which communication occurs 
through the aid of electronic systems, but a preliminary plan is established based on the 
information available to the fire department before the burning structure is ever 
approached. 
Coordination is especially important in fighting high-rise fires. The importance of 
coordination in fighting high-rise fires is highlighted in the practitioner literature, “there 
is no room for freelancing at fires, especially in high-rise buildings.”120 Two further 
reasons are critical for coordination in fighting fires in high-rise buildings. The first is the 
need to be able to rescue firefighters who are incapacitated, and the second is the 
possibility that some portions of the building are or will become too dangerous to 
approach.  
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Firefighters in a high rise have firsthand knowledge of only part of the situation. 
The on-site coordinator, by contrast, receives reports from multiple different teams of 
firefighters and can observe the situation outside the building. Imagine, to illustrate the 
importance of effective communication, a multiple-front fire in a high rise being fought 
on several floors, and the top floor collapses partially. The firefighters on the top floor of 
course are aware of this collapse, and if the building in question is vulnerable to 
progressive collapse, they know to evacuate or at least retreat. Firefighters further down, 
however, are not aware that a collapse has begun, and may be trapped if the collapse 
continues. For another example, imagine a structure in which two sides of floor 26 (the 
north and west sides) are engulfed in flame, and one side of floor 27 (the north side) is 
also burning. It is possible for an outside observer to see flames crawling up from the 
windows of floor 26, and if they spread to floor 27, the firefighters on that floor are 
subsequently surrounded by those flames. Thus, the team on that floor is not be able to 
observe the situation until it was too late, or nearly so—and even if they can, they are 
probably so distracted to the point of not realizing the danger. 
The effectiveness of electronic communication methods for high-rise firefighters 
is thus of paramount importance. However, firefighter communication technologies are 
generally weak.121 Technologies in place to facilitate communication often fail. The 
reasons are manifold, as discussed previously; heat and suspended particulate matter can 
interfere with communication effectiveness. Some fire departments may have outdated 
communication technology that cannot function properly at the distances necessitated by 
very tall buildings, or that cannot ensure adequate signal strength when separated by 20 
floors of insulating material. In extreme cases, also, communications networks can 
become oversaturated. All these occurrences are problematic even without considering 
the possibility of intentional efforts to impair communication.122 
With respect to the research that must be undertaken, then, it is necessary to have 
a clearer idea, based on sound science, of just how urgent the need to modernize 
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firefighter communication is. Such an inquiry ideally consists of three components. The 
first is to evaluate proposed systems (and systems actually in use by fire departments) for 
their ability to facilitate communication between multiple firefighter teams 
simultaneously. In other words, the risk of saturation of available frequencies must be 
considered. Of particular note is the point that it may be insufficient to have a system that 
can stand up to the traffic of having all the department’s firefighters on the air, because 
parallel public safety organizations are likely to use similar wireless systems, and in a 
large-scale attack, are very likely to be deployed to the same location. At a confirmed 
terrorist attack, for instance, the police or the Department of Homeland Security are 
almost certain to be on the scene quickly; even when terrorism is a mere possibility, 
medical personnel are normally on-scene. The second component is to consider the 
potential effect of particulate matter on the efficacy of the communication system. The 
third component is to consider the effect of any intentional efforts to jam the 
communication system. What is important to note is that these situations cannot all be 
applied separately; it is essential that some sort of understanding as to how frequency 
saturation may make a communication system more susceptible to accidental or 
intentional jamming, for instance. 
With respect to how this research should be applied in the creation of sound 
policy, it is difficult to say without knowing in advance what the results of such an 
investigation can be; it may well be that a technically ideal solution is unfeasibly 
expensive. At the very least, moreover, decision makers should have the benefit of such 
an analysis when making purchasing decisions. Perhaps more importantly, first 
responders should also have this information. The on-site leadership should know, for 
instance, that at their maximum deployment of five teams, if two teams of medics are 
also on-site and heavy voice traffic is occurring, then their communications system 
become excessively vulnerable to intentional jamming or disruption as a result of smoke 
and suspended particles. Thus, responders are able to plan for this eventuality simply by 
knowing that the wireless system is at a higher risk of failure. 
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B. ACCOUNTING FOR AIR MOVEMENT 
A critical point in fighting high-rise fires is air movement within the building—
that depends on the HVAC system123—and air movement from outside the building.124 
With respect to air movement within the building, this movement is relevant both because 
relatively oxygen-rich air can be fed by natural circulation or the HVAC to the fire, 
which allows it to grow quickly when it may otherwise have slowed due to a lack of 
oxygen. Feeding the fire may in fact be a mixed blessing, as it greatly reduces the risk of 
backdraft, but this advantage is likely not worth the cost of allowing the fire to intensify 
and spread before the firefighters can arrive on-scene to control it. The HVAC can also 
circulate smoke to areas that otherwise may have been smoke-free. Allowing smoke to 
spread throughout the building can make a fire much more difficult to combat because it 
impairs visibility and requires resources to be devoted away from firefighting and 
towards the immediate evacuation of all civilians within the building. Although the 
evacuation of civilians is always a priority, it may be possible to focus manpower on 
containing a fire rather than on assisting the evacuation if the fire is in only one portion of 
a building and the evacuees are not at risk of carbon monoxide poisoning or the other 
harms of smoke inhalation. 
C. EVACUATION 
Firefighters may find it difficult or impossible to assist with an evacuation in a 
high-rise because they do not have access to the higher floors. Exterior access by 
firefighters generally does not exceed seven stories.125 This situation is not commonly 
problematic, as the overwhelming majority of high-rise fires are extinguished before 
firefighter arrival and started below the 7th story, but they can certainly pose challenges 
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when a fire is intentionally set to frustrate firefighter response.126 Where evacuation is 
necessary, and firefighters are required to assist with evacuation, the difficulties 
associated with evacuating people from—say—the 20th floor of a high-rise should be 
obvious. Not only do firefighters have to travel to these people, transporting a device 
(invariably bulky) with which to evacuate them, they may also have difficulties locating 
the people to be evacuated, especially when the building is filled with smoke, which is 
when the need for evacuation is greatest.  
An emerging challenge for firefighters, which may be more significant, is the use 
of elevators for evacuation.127 In previous years, elevators have been used only by 
firefighters in evacuation, because they allow firefighters to reach the fire quickly and 
without becoming out of breath.128 They have generally not been necessary for evacuees. 
For what should be obvious reasons, elevators are generally more beneficial to persons 
needing to ascend than persons needing to descend. However, the advent of super-high-
rise buildings is changing this paradigm.129 A 100-story building with congested 
evacuation corridors (that be achieved by an even moderately sophisticated terrorist who, 
e.g., sabotages a fire staircase with a slippery substance, broken glass, or more significant 
weapons) takes around two hours to evacuate completely. High-speed elevators of the 
kind and quantity necessitated by high-rise buildings, by contrast, allows for relatively 
rapid evacuation, on the order of fractions of an hour. Questions of organization of 
evacuees to promote the efficient use of elevators are beyond the scope of this thesis; 
what is important to keep in mind is that the use of elevators for fire evacuation, which 
was formerly verboten, may in fact be necessary today.  
Although promising from a perspective concerned primarily with life safety in 
high-rise buildings, it is concerning from a perspective that also considers the importance 
of facilitating firefighting efforts. Evacuation of burning buildings commonly occurs at 
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the same time as fire response.130 Evacuation and firefighting efforts are especially likely 
to coincide in the case of high-rise buildings because, as mentioned earlier, evacuation of 
such buildings takes a very long time. The concern is not the lack of enough elevators for 
both firefighters and evacuees—reserving even two elevators for fire response units is 
likely resolve this situation—but rather that firefighting tactics must accommodate these 
changed circumstances. In particular, forcing evacuees to exit at roughly the same spot in 
the building as firefighters enter (as elevators usually cluster together) seems likely to 
slow fire response and make it more difficult for evacuees to exit the building quickly.  
The terrorist, especially the terrorist intending to cause casualties among 
responders, may strike at high-rise buildings too fire-resistant to be targeted by an 
unsophisticated arsonist, or may strike with the intent of causing collapse rather than 
simply fire damage. Attacks presenting a serious risk of structural collapse necessitate 
complete evacuation of structures not intended to be evacuated.131 Reliance on burnout 
may be misplaced if the conditions on which burnout predictions are predicated (e.g., that 
fire sprinklers will function normally and that laminated insulation panels will not serve 
as fuel) hold true. Sabotage of a building prior to an act of arson can prevent burnout or at 
least allow a fire to spread much further before burnout. Similarly, it is impossible to be 
certain that partial collapse will not occur, even with a very secure structure. Even if 
robustness allows planners to be relatively confident that a local collapse will not turn 
into a complete collapse, such a scenario necessitates at least partial, and probably full, 
evacuation of the structure. First responders who wish to be prepared to combat pyro-
terrorism therefore must be prepared to evacuate buildings not intended to be evacuated. 
D. COLLABORATION WITH OTHER AGENCIES 
Some of the literature on responding to terrorist attacks has highlighted the 
importance of intelligence sharing and coordination with first responders to mitigate the 
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threats presented by terrorists aiming for emergency personnel.132 The lack of 
intelligence sharing is a fact lamented by scholars.133 At least two sorts of intelligence-
based mitigation are possible. The first is prospective mitigation of risks based on general 
intelligence available to law enforcement about likely targets and avenues of attack. For 
example, this sort of risk mitigation suggests that the Department of Homeland Security, 
knowing that a particular terrorist group is active in a city, and knowing that 
communications within this group have been exchanged about the possibility of arson 
and several possible targets, should share that information with the fire department 
responsible for responding to such attacks. However, numerous barriers to this sort of 
intelligence sharing abound, only some of which are easily resolved. In addition to the 
general inefficiency associated with inter-departmental information sharing, it is also 
possible that this sort of information sharing should require the disclosure of sensitive 
information, particularly information that may jeopardize the law enforcement response 
to the planned terrorist attack. 
No less important, and likely easier to achieve, is intelligence sharing to facilitate 
a response to ongoing attacks. The importance of this sort of information sharing should 
be readily apparent from the previous discussion of the numerous ways in which terrorist 
arsons can be more dangerous than unintentional fires and even than less sophisticated 
arsons. To understand how to achieve this sharing, consider perhaps the most significant 
barrier to pre-incident information sharing between first responders and law enforcement 
or intelligence agencies is the risk that sharing information with first responders may 
jeopardize a law enforcement operation.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
One of the major concerns that the author had in developing this thesis—one of 
the greatest challenges that he had to overcome—was that very little has actually been 
written about the threat of sophisticated arson of any kind against high-rises, to say 
nothing of the threat of pyro-terrorism. Were the author a scholar attempting to perform a 
quantitative inquiry into the potentially greater destruction that can be caused by a 
sophisticated arsonist with knowledge of a building’s fire safety design and the skills 
necessary to sabotage that design, he would have been stymied by the almost complete 
lack of literature directly relating to this topic. Of course, “it’s hard” is not much of an 
excuse for a scholar, but it is a problem for an academic who has identified a concern of 
pressing practical importance that should be addressed in the literature and in practice as 
soon as possible.  
Even with that sound justification, though, it is difficult to present a large 
literature review as a thesis without significant analytic work leading to conclusions of 
importance. It is the author’s position that this thesis presents just such analytic work, as 
well. In keeping with his goal of facilitating scholarly development of this topic in the 
future, he has identified the most pressing research needs and provides the following 
recommendations for both practical and scholarly work.  
A. THEORETICAL WORK ON PYRO-TERRORISM 
The academic community thus far has not taken seriously the concern that pyro-
terrorism presents significant differences from other forms of terrorism.134 Although 
some scholars have examined the risks of pyro-terrorism in detail, others have suggested 
that it is just one tool among many available to terrorists, and the possibilities it presents 
are not fundamentally different from those presented by, e.g., explosives. This suggestion 
is false. Thinking of arson as part of a static toolkit available to terrorists overlooks the 
latent possibilities for destruction and violence available to the sophisticated arsonist and 
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assuming that those possibilities remain forever dormant is naive and irresponsible. That 
terrorists have thus far not enthusiastically embraced the unique potential of arson as a 
weapon does not at all suggest that they will not do so at some point in the future; indeed, 
as countermeasures against explosives become more and more sophisticated, it seems 
likely that terrorists will turn to arson as a way of making use of more common and less 
detection-prone tools. 
Some have suggested that the pioneering work of Baird and Deshpande 
discussing the possible proliferation of pyro-terrorism is at best needless fear mongering 
and at worst may actually suggest new forms of attack.135 However, this fear is not well 
founded. Reviews of the literature with respect to terrorism predictions suggest that the 
more urgent danger is the potential for “failures of the imagination” like those that 
permitted the 9/11 hijackings.136 Terrorists have proven adept at spotting vulnerabilities 
in the many targets available to them; suggesting that such vulnerabilities should not be 
discussed for fear of giving ideas to the terrorists encourages perpetuation of those 
vulnerabilities. Moreover, it seems simply false to suggest that terrorists may not discover 
on their own the potential of fire as a weapon, as Palestinian militants137 have used fire as 
a weapon for quite some time.138 
B. RISK ASSESSMENT 
One critical concern for mitigating the threat posed by pyro-terrorism is allocating 
resources and understanding where the threat of pyro-terrorism is most significant. The 
theoretical framework offered by Deshpande for risk assessment with respect to pyro-
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terrorism is sound, but should be extended beyond wildfire risk.139 Some research has 
been done on quantifying the risk of pyro-terrorism in a particular case, but that research 
focuses on the protection of federal buildings in particular and may not easily be adapted 
to a broader context.140 
In the interests of providing guidance for filling gaps in the literature, the 
researcher briefly discusses the characteristics that a framework suitable for evaluating 
the risk of pyro-terrorism should have. First and foremost, as both Neale and Deshpande 
note, such a framework should consider the physical vulnerability of a potential target. 
This vulnerability concerns more than just the vulnerability when all systems are 
functioning as designed. In the case of a sophisticated attack, such systems will often fail 
(and in fact, many such systems do fail through a lack of maintenance or poor design 
even when the attacker does not target those systems).141 Such an analysis should 
consider at least the redundancy of fire protection and mitigation systems, the degree to 
which such protections or systems operate effectively even when response teams act 
incorrectly (as may be the case when an arson attack is disguised as a fire resulting from 
mechanical or human error, which reduced the perceived likelihood that it may expand 
beyond projections), and the degree to which such systems are physically protected from 
unauthorized access and potential sabotage. 
Second, a framework for evaluating pyro-terrorism risk should consider the value 
of a potential target to terrorists, which, of course, considers the economic harm a 
terrorist may produce by attacking the target. However, recall the earlier discussion of the 
factors contributing to the relative preference terrorists seem to have for explosives over 
arson. A key consideration for a risk of terrorism is the symbolic victory that terrorists 
may obtain by destroying a target, and particularly, the symbolic victory they may obtain 
by destroying it in a particular way. For instance, the tallest buildings in a city are 
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disproportionately valuable targets for pyro-terrorism simply because of the visual impact 
of seeing such a building on fire. 
Third, such a framework needs to consider the ability of law enforcement and 
firefighters to respond to such an attack. This consideration itself has two prongs. With 
respect to a law enforcement response, a critical concern is the perceived likelihood of 
apprehending the terrorist (not necessarily the actual likelihood). Although the previous 
discussion suggests that terrorists are not encouraged by the relative low risk of certain 
kinds of arson, it is nevertheless probable that, given the choice between two targets, a 
terrorist may prefer the target most likely to preserve the ability to strike again. 
Consequently, if the vulnerable points of a particular target are in high-traffic areas or 
especially areas with security camera coverage, a target may be somewhat less 
vulnerable. With respect to firefighter and (to a lesser degree) medical response, a critical 
concern is the perceived efficacy of the firefighting departments responding to a 
contemplated attack. To be discussed in a later section, firefighter tactics can mitigate 
some of the advantages that arson holds for the terrorist; in any event, a better fire 
department is likely to reduce the effectiveness of any act of pyro-terrorism. It 
consequently seems likely that pyro-terrorists prefer targets protected by less 
sophisticated fire departments, all else being equal. 
Finally, in line with the earlier discussion of second-wave attacks, a framework 
for assessing pyro-terrorism risk needs to consider the vulnerability of first responders 
responding to an attack on the target in question. This consideration is important for two 
reasons. First, attacks may be motivated by a desire to attack first responders, and targets 
at which first responders may be vulnerable are therefore more attractive targets. Second, 
and probably more importantly, is that a higher risk of pyro-terrorism necessitates a 
greater degree of physical security, greater robustness, and redundancy of sprinkler 
systems and similar mechanisms, and generally reduces the likelihood that a particular 
act of arson is effective. These measures make it more likely that, in the event that a 
terrorist attack is attempted and first responders are targeted, that attack is unsuccessful. 
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C. BUILDING CODES 
The goal in developing building codes should be to produce (1) a hybrid 
performance-based and prescriptive framework, (2) a framework that is narrowly tailored 
to protect buildings at high risk without imposing unduly onerous requirements on other 
development, and (3) a framework suitable not just for minimizing the building’s 
vulnerability to arson but also for standardizing characteristics of the structure that should 
not vary from building to building.  
With respect to the first point, the reasons for preferring a hybrid performance-
based and prescriptive framework are set out earlier and are not repeated again. Such a 
framework should include, at a minimum, performance-based standards for structural 
integrity, to include robustness in the face of a partial collapse, the requirement that fires, 
in the absence of accelerants, burn themselves out quickly enough to permit the survival 
of any persons trapped within the building, and human safety requirements like 
ventilation standards and flame-resistant, evacuable corridors. Once a hybrid framework 
is adopted, the performance-based standards should be set higher than what may be 
“realistic” at the time of the code’s drafting, to encourage technological development and 
greater safety while also providing the alternative of defaulting to the prescriptions in the 
code. 
With respect to the second point, an important concern arises. How should an 
anti-terrorism building code be applied to accommodate the fact that the usage of modern 
buildings is rarely certain when the buildings are constructed, and may in fact change 
over time? Perhaps more importantly, how can it possibly be applied to some vulnerable 
groups (e.g., religious minorities) without infringing upon Constitutional guarantees of 
political and religious neutrality? Consider one hypothetical code and two hypothetical 
cases in which that code cannot be applied reasonably. This hypothetical building code 
may have two tiers of requirements, one for especially at-risk buildings (e.g., 
governmental buildings, hospitals, and so on) and one for buildings not judged to be at 
risk of pyro-terrorism.  
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In the first hypothetical instance, it is possible to run into legal problems if certain 
at-risk groups are treated differently from the general population. Imagine, for instance, 
that anti-Jewish terrorism is on the rise, and it is consequently determined (by some 
viewpoint-neutral and thus constitutional rubric) that synagogues are especially 
vulnerable to terrorism. Synagogues are then subjected to greater requirements than other 
religious or nonreligious groups based solely on their vulnerability to terrorism, which—
although well-intentioned—is almost certainly not permissible under First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  
The second hypothetical situation reveals another problem with this approach. 
Imagine that a particular building is constructed according to the lower standard (for 
instance, because it is a single-use office building owned entirely by one company) and 
then gradually becomes higher risk over time. This scenario may happen because part of 
the building is sold or leased, which makes it a multi-use building and thus more valuable 
as a target. It also happens because the corporation holding the building becomes 
politically unpopular with certain groups and is targeted for that reason (for instance, if 
the corporation is a biotechnology firm that experiments on animals or uses stem cells). 
No good options exist for the regulatory body seeking to enforce its fire safety code in 
such a circumstance. 
The solution is to adopt a several-tier approach, one based primarily on the 
inherent attractiveness (to terrorists) of certain purpose-built structures and on structural 
vulnerabilities of other structures. This approach at least is made up of three tiers. The 
first—the tier requiring the least in the way of fire safety measures—are buildings below 
a certain height in stories or maximum occupancy, or in areas of lower population density 
(i.e., not in the center of a city). These are not likely to be at an inherently high risk of 
terrorism; moreover, even if they are burned, the human cost and economic damage to 
both is relatively lower than in the case of larger, higher-occupancy structures, especially 
considering it is easier to put out a fire in a smaller building and easier to evacuate such a 
building.  
The second tier is used for buildings not inherently attractive to terrorists because 
of some political or symbolic significance to a successful attack, but which nevertheless 
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suffers significant damage and risk many lives if attacked. Buildings in this category 
include most buildings in city centers, and certainly all high-rise buildings. Although 
these buildings may lack inherent significance to a terrorist, keep two considerations in 
mind. The first is that because of their propensity to become multi-function buildings or 
to change ownership with the economic tides, they are somewhat likely to become 
attractive targets to terrorists, for the reasons discussed previously. The second 
consideration, though, is more important. Even if the risk of terrorism against a building 
in this tier is no greater than in the first tier (which is unlikely) the potential costs of an 
act of pyro-terrorism against a large building in a city center are far greater. Such 
buildings are more expensive, more populated, and have less space around them, which 
makes them more likely to damage other buildings as well. 
The third tier is for purpose-built buildings not likely to change hands, can be 
lawfully singled out for special treatment by regulators, and is likely to be attractive to 
terrorists. Governmental buildings (especially federal buildings), schools, hospitals, and 
the like all fall into this category. Within this tier, of course, the architectural 
characteristics of the structure are taken into account.  
With respect to the third point that a building safety framework should exhibit, it 
is important to consider the potential uses for prescriptive elements of a building code. In 
general, the author supports the availability of performance-based alternatives for most 
building safety provisions; however, he acknowledges that in some areas, performance is 
difficult to measure or standardization is necessary. One example of the former is the 
requirement that commercial buildings have standardized exit signs. Such a requirement 
can be supplemented by a performance-based alternative (e.g., that commercial buildings 
must have some way of clearly identifying safe exit paths), but measuring effectiveness at 
satisfying that requirement can be difficult, if not impossible. It seems likely that most 
safety measures related to human behavior and responses to a fire need to be prescriptive 
rather than performance-based. 
The second case in which prescription is essential is where standardization is 
necessary. An example presents itself in that standardization is often necessary to support 
a tactical firefighting response. So-called “glowing walkways” are intended to light up 
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smoky corridors so that firefighters can navigate them safely. More effective way of 
doing so may be available, but firefighters are trained to respond to the glowing walkway 
design, and so it should be mandated to enable firefighters to respond as they have been 
trained. 
A final point that the author wishes to raise in the conclusion is that providing a 
schematic outline of an ideal building safety code is not all that is needed for regulators to 
mitigate the risks of pyro-terrorism successfully; they should also have a robust set of 
tools to use in “filling in” that outline. The author makes two recommendations The first 
is the adoption of a mixed-methods analysis of existing fire prevention systems, both in 
the development of new codes and in updating those codes. The second is the adoption of 
a method for identifying hypothetical fire scenarios and revising codes based on those 
scenarios. 
A mixed qualitative and quantitative analysis of past fires can be illustrative in 
identifying failure points in fire prevention systems and codes.142 Such approaches have 
been considered with respect to fire chronologies. A fire chronology is essentially a 
timeline of the development of a past fire. In developing such a timeline, investigators 
seek to answer questions like “why was the fire able to move from its starting point to 
some other point of vulnerability, and how could we revise our countermeasures to 
prevent this in the future?” A mixed-methods approach to fire chronologies allows 
investigators also to consider witness statements and interviews with survivors of the fire. 
This last point can be especially important because a critical concern in fire safety is not 
just how the physical structure responded to the fire, but also how victims behaved, and 
what behaviors allowed them to escape or impeded that escape. This point is especially 
relevant when it comes to developing safety codes intended to mitigate the risk of arson 
designed to kill the inhabitants of a building. 
Other measures of fire performance, applicable in retrospect, may also be highly 
useful in such cases. Chief among these is the “temperature history,” a fire chronology in 
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which temperature loads—that is, the heat released by the burning of fuel available in a 
given space, commonly a single room—are calculated based on structural fuel and any 
fire mitigation like sprinklers.143 This form of fire chronology is especially useful 
because the strictly quantitative, scientific nature of the analysis also allows investigators 
to consider questions like “how would the temperature load have changed if the timber 
supports had delaminated and combusted?” 
Such hypothetical questions are highly relevant when designing safety systems for 
arson. The majority of fires are either accidental or the product of unsophisticated arson, 
meaning that much more data is available on how such fires will progress. By examining 
hypothetical questions (e.g., “how would this fire have been different if the sprinkler 
system had been sabotaged, causing it to not work properly?”), regulators can take 
lessons even from accidental fires that are relevant to the mitigation of pyro-terrorism.144 
Mixed-methods approaches have already been applied to the development of fire 
safety codes through the use of fire scenarios.145 A framework for developing fire 
scenarios to inform fire safety protocols and codes is discussed, and it should be adapted 
to accommodate the special risks presented by sophisticated arsonists.146 Such a 
framework may consist of the identification of plausible accidental fires—as already 
occurs—and determine whether those fires can be made more severe through sabotage of 
mitigation systems. It also requires the identification of fire scenarios that are only likely 
if a fire is intentionally set, and assess the plausibility of such scenarios. The 
consideration of such hypothetical scenarios is not just essential for evaluating a 
building’s safety against arson; it also can assist in the training of fire response teams.  
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D. TACTICAL MITIGATION 
This section lays out the conclusions that can be drawn from the earlier discussion 
about firefighter tactics in responding to high-rise fires and especially in response to 
cases of pyro-terrorism. It provides a research agenda for future investigation, because 
some questions have not yet been empirically investigated with sufficient depth to 
formulate policy recommendations. It also provides a set of schematic guidelines for the 
development of tactical mitigation strategies for the risks posed by these challenges.  
1. Evacuation 
Based on the difficulty of evacuating ultra-high-rise buildings on foot, it seems 
that at least some elevators in ultra-high-rises should be used for evacuation. Therefore, a 
gap in the literature exists with respect to two questions. First, how can the use of 
elevators when evacuation needs are urgent be managed efficiently? Most elevators are 
not equipped with the technology necessary to determine that people are remaining on the 
floor to be evacuated. Will evacuation depend on which floors can get to the elevator 
buttons most quickly? It is also likely that some people will want to leave before their 
elevator is completely full, even if others are waiting to evacuate. The question of what 
technical system to put in place to ensure that elevators are used effectively in 
evacuations is one that should be reserved for scholars studying crowd behavior and the 
use of technology to manage crowds. 
Just as significant is the second question, which is a question of pedagogy. In the 
United States, at least, it is drilled into the heads of children that they should never use 
the elevators in a fire; they should use the stairs, instead. Overcoming that education will 
doubtless be difficult, as will convincing evacuees that it really is safer to wait 10 minutes 
on the same floor than to take the stairs to the ground floor. 
A final question that is not pressing now but will be in the future is how to protect 
elevator shafts from sabotage. Elevators have robust safety mechanisms in place to 
prevent them from falling or otherwise injuring their inhabitants. They generally err on 
the side of stopping in place rather than proceeding upwards or downwards when it might 
be risky. Under ordinary circumstances, this situation occurs, as it should. If elevators 
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become a major method of evacuation, however, an elevator that will shut itself down 
readily may become a deathtrap at the slightest hint of sabotage. Moreover, evacuees 
relying on the sabotaged elevators may be prevented from evacuating the building before 
the fire spreads.  
2. Intelligence-Sharing and Pyro-terrorism 
One of the key concerns discussed earlier is the difficulty of sharing intelligence 
related to potentially sensitive questions of homeland security with departments that do 
not ordinarily have a homeland security role (for instance, fire departments). As was 
discussed previously, wholesale sharing of potential terrorist targets in a particular 
municipality runs a serious risk of alerting terrorists that their communications or plans 
have been intercepted. What is needed is a method by which information specific to pyro-
terrorism can be shared with fire departments, in advance, when it is clearly related to 
pyro-terrorism, or during a fire, where a burning building had been previously identified 
as a potential target of any sort of terrorism. 
Suppose, therefore, that instead of immediately sharing intelligence with fire 
departments when they become aware of an elevated potential for acts of terrorism, 
intelligence agencies instead track three things. The first is the general location (an entire 
metropolitan area, for instance) in which an instance of pyro-terrorism is considered more 
likely. The second is the specific addresses at which pyro-terrorism is considered more 
likely. The third is the specific addresses at which any sort of terrorism is considered 
more likely. Fire departments, for their part, can conduct risk assessments within their 
area of responsibility and focus on high-profile buildings, to assess vulnerability to pyro-
terrorism and also to formulate the most likely pyro-terrorism scenarios (versus 
accidental fires and unsophisticated arsons).  
In responding to large fires, the fire department determines, first, whether the fire 
is in a structure identified as being at high risk of pyro-terrorism, and second, whether the 
fire is behaving unusually compared to predicted fire scenarios (by way of example, 
originating in an unlikely place or spreading more quickly than predicted). If either are 
true, the fire department must notify the responsible intelligence agency; even if neither is 
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true, the fire department should inform the responsible agency of the address at which the 
fire occurred. The intelligence agency responds by disclosing its relevant information: (1) 
if the address reported for any fire is one of the addresses at an elevated risk of pyro-
terrorism, (2) if the address reported for an unusual fire is one of the addresses at an 
elevated risk of terrorism, (3) if the address reported for an unusual fire is within a 
metropolitan area at an elevated risk of pyro-terrorism, and (4) if the address reported is 
identified by the fire department as being vulnerable to pyro-terrorism and is within a 
metropolitan area at an elevated risk of pyro-terrorism. 
E. SUMMARY 
This thesis has established a pressing need for a wide range of theoretical and 
practical changes to protect against the threat of pyro-terrorism better. Needed 
developments are a framework of a building’s risk of being targeted by terrorist arson, 
suitable for application to cost-benefit analyses and security agency risk management 
teams, a building code framework that enables regulatory bodies to account for the risk of 
pyro-terrorism when assessing development projects, a method by which fire 
chronologies may be adapted to assess the possibility that pyro-terrorism is involved, a 
mixed-methods analysis of potential future pyro-terrorism events as “fire scenarios” to 
enable the development of specific pyro-terrorism countermeasures for high-risk 
buildings, research into the capabilities of currently used and potential future 
communications systems for firefighters, pedagogical and systems analyses of the 
possibility of using high-speed elevators for high-rise evacuation where necessary, and an 
information-sharing system by which departments with access to sensitive information 
can share that information with fire departments as needed without jeopardizing security 
by revealing that information wholesale.  
Some potential solutions to these problems have already been considered, and the 
solutions that have been discussed in this thesis, schematic as they necessarily are, appear 
to this author to be sound. It is hoped that these solutions prove to be a sound jumping-off 
point for future scholars who wish to tackle these issues. Tentative recommendations 
have also been provided, which may be for departments of security or fire departments to 
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address rather than the scholarly literature. These practical recommendations focus more 
on the potential avenues available for improving fire safety that have already been 
discussed in the literature, or else approaches that are clearly likely to be effective based 
on indirect evidence in the literature.  
The greatest value of this thesis, though, lies in demonstrating the risk of an 
avenue of attack that has thus far not been exploited by terrorists to any significant 
degree. Despite the advances in firefighting tactics and technology and the safety 
improvements provided by building safety codes, a sophisticated arsonist can cause a 
great deal of harm, in terms of economic damage, lost civilian lives, and first responder 
casualties. Even without considering the recommendations presented in this thesis, it is 
valuable because of its potential to prevent “failure of the imagination” scenarios, like 
those that allowed the 9/11 attacks to succeed.  
  
 74
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 75
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ackerman, Gary A. “Beyond Arson? A Threat Assessment of the Earth Liberation 
Front.” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (October 1, 2003): 143–170. 
Akyuz, Kadir, and Todd Armstrong. “Understanding the Sociostructural Correlates of 
Terrorism in Turkey.” International Criminal Justice Review 21, no. 2 (May 12, 
2011): 134–155. 
Angle, James S., Michael F. Gala, David Harlow, and William B. Lombardo. Firefighting 
Strategies and Tactics. Burlington, MA: Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2013. 
Asai, Yasufumi, and Jeffrey L. Arnold. “Terrorism in Japan.” Prehospital and Disaster 
Medicine 18, no. 2 (April 2003): 106–114. 
Atran, Scott. “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism.” The Washington 
Quarterly 29, no. 2 (March 1, 2006): 127–147. 
Babrauskas, Vytenis, Joseph M. Fleming, and B. Don Russell. “RSET/ASET, A Flawed 
Concept for Fire Safety Assessment.” Fire and Materials 34, no. 7 (November 1, 
2010): 341–355. 
Baird, Robert Arthur. “Pyro-Terrorism-The Threat of Arson Induced Forest Fires as a 
Future Terrorist Weapon of Mass Destruction.” Master’s thesis, Marine Corps 
University, 2005. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a509220.pdf. 
———. “Pyro-Terrorism—The Threat of Arson-Induced Forest Fires as a Future 
Terrorist Weapon of Mass Destruction.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 5 
(August 1, 2006): 415–428. 
Bakker, Edwin. Forecasting the Unpredictable: A Review of Forecasts on Terrorism 
2000–2012. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. https:// 
www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Bakker-Forecasting-the-Unpredictable-July-2012. 
pdf. 
Barber, David, and Robert Gerard. “Summary of the Fire Protection Foundation Report—
Fire Safety Challenges of Tall Wood Buildings.” Fire Science Reviews 4, no. 1 
(December 1, 2015): 1–15. 
Bartkowski, John P., Frank M. Howell, and Shu-Chuan Lai. “Spatial Variations in 
Church Burnings: The Social Ecology of Victimized Communities in the South.” 
Rural Sociology 67, no. 4 (2002): 578–602. 
BBC News. “What Happened at Grenfell Tower?.” July 19, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/uk-england-london-40272168. 
 76
Beitel, Jesse, and Nestor Iwankiw. “Historical Survey of Multistory Building Collapses 
Due to Fire.” Fire Protection Engineering 27 (2005): 42. 
Bennetts, Ian, Lam Pham, and Others. “Structural Robustness and Fire.” In Australasian 
Structural Engineering Conference: ASEC 2016. Barton, Australia: Engineers 
Australia, 2016. 
Besenyő, János. “Inferno Terror: Forest Fires as the New Form of Terrorism.” Terrorism 
and Political Violence (July 11, 2017): 1–13. 
Bhandarwar, A. H., G. D. Bakhshi, M. B. Tayade, A. D. Borisa, N. R. Thadeshwar, and 
S. S. Gandhi. “Surgical Response to the 2008 Mumbai Terror Attack.” The British 
Journal of Surgery 99, no. 3 (March 2012): 368–372. 
Boustras, Georgios, and Nikolaos Boukas. “Forest Fires’ Impact on Tourism 
Development: A Comparative Study of Greece and Cyprus.” Management of 
Environmental Quality: An International Journal 24, no. 4 (2013): 498–511. 
Bowker, Gary. “Firefighting Tactics to Beat 21st Century Fires.” FireRescue1. July 15, 
2012. https://www.firerescue1.com/fire-attack/articles/1315403-Firefighting-tactics-
to-beat-21st-century-fires/. 
Boyd, Dallas. “Protecting Sensitive Information: The Virtue of Self-Restraint.” 
Homeland Security Affairs 7, no. 1 (2011). http://search.proquest.com/openview/ 
29273935064a3138f13d2859f28a4af2/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=1336360. 
Bukowski, Richard W., and Erica D. Kuligowski. “The Basis for Egress Provisions in 
U.S. Building Codes.” In Proceedings of InterFlam. Fire Research Division, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004. 
http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire04/ 
PDF/f04031.pdf. 
Bukowski, Richard W., and Robert C. Spetzler. “Analysis of the Happyland Social Club 
Fire with Hazard I.” Journal of Fire Protection Engineering 4, no. 4 (November 1, 
1992): 117–130. 
Cłapa, Iwona, Marcin Cisek, Piotr Tofiło, and Marek Dziubiński. “Firefighters 
Ascending and Evacuation Speeds during Counter Flow on Staircase.” Safety 
Science 78 (October 1, 2015): 35–40. 
Collier, P. C. R., and G. B. Baker. “The Influence of Construction Detailing on the Fire 
Performance of Polystyrene Insulated Panels.” Fire Technology 49, no. 2 (April 1, 
2013): 195–211. 
Crenshaw, Martha. “The Strategic Logic of Terrorism.” In Conflict after the Cold War: 
Arguments on Causes of War and Peace, edited by Richard K. Betts, 448–461. New 
York: Routledge, 2017.  
 77
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism.” 
International Security 27, no. 3 (January 1, 2003): 30–58. 
Deshpande, Nick. “Pyro-Terrorism: Recent Cases and the Potential for Proliferation.” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 1 (January 23, 2009): 36–44. 
Díaz-Barrado, Cástor Miguel. “The Definition of Terrorism and International Law.” In 
International Legal Dimension of Terrorism, edited by Pablo Antonio Fernández-
Sánchez. 27–42. Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008.  
Dorevitch, Samuel, Hakan Demirtas, Victoria W. Perksy, Serap Erdal, Lorraine Conroy, 
Todd Schoonover, and Peter A. Scheff. “Demolition of High-Rise Public Housing 
Increases Particulate Matter Air Pollution in Communities of High-Risk 
Asthmatics.” Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association 56, no. 7 (July 
2006): 1022–1032. 
Emerson, Earl. Pyro: A Novel of Suspense. New York: Ballantine Books, 2005. 
Ewen, S. Fighting Fires: Creating the British Fire Service, 1800–1978. Berlin, Germany: 
Springer, 2009. 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. “NIMS Frequently Asked Questions.” 
Accessed July 28, 2017. https://www.fema.gov/nims-frequently-asked-questions. 
Fighel, Jonathan. “The ‘Forest Jihad.’” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 9 
(September 4, 2009): 802–810. 
Foo, Kong Pin G. “Exploring First Responder Tactics in a Terrorist Chemical Attack.” 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/cit 
ations/ADA494195. 
Garis, Len, Paul Maxim, Larry Thomas, and Karin Mark. Construction Site Fire 
Response. Abbotsford, BC, Canada: University of the Fraser Valley, 2015. 
http://wood-works.ca/wp-content/uploads/UFV-Research-Construction-Site-Fire-
Response-Mar-2015.pdf. 
Garrido, Sara, and John Nicoletti. “First Responder Psychological Recovery Following a 
Mass Casualty Event.” In Police Psychology and Its Growing Impact on Modern 
Law Enforcement, edited by Cary L. Mitchell and Edrick H. Dorian. 143–157. 
Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2017. 
Gershon, Robyn R. M., Kristine A. Qureshi, Marcie S. Rubin, and Victoria H. Raveis. 
“Factors Associated with High-Rise Evacuation: Qualitative Results from the World 
Trade Center Evacuation Study.” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 22, no. 3 (May 
2007): 165–173. 
 78
Gissi, Emanuele, Enrico Ronchi, and David A. Purser. “Transparency vs Magic 
Numbers: The Development of Stair Design Requirements in the Italian Fire Safety 
Code.” Fire Safety Journal 91 (July 1, 2017): 882–891. 
Goldstein, Harry “Radio Contact in High-Rises Can Quit on Firefighters.” IEEE 
Spectrum 39, no. 4 (April 2002): 24–27. 
Gordon, Jason S., Robert K. Grala, Eghbal Rashidi, Hugh R. Medal, Will Leonard, 
Maxwell Moseley, and Kelsey Seiter. “Wildfire Terrorism Risk Assessment and 
Management: A Pilot Study.” Forest Economics and Policy in a Changing 
Environment: How Market, Policy, and Climate Transformations Affect Forests 
(2016): 94. 
Gordon, Peter, James E. Moore, Ji Young Park, and Harry W. Richardson. “The 
Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack on the U.S. Commercial Aviation System.” 
Risk Analysis: An Official Publication of the Society for Risk Analysis 27, no. 3 
(June 1, 2007): 505–512. 
Hadjisophocleous, George V., Noureddine Benichou, and Amal S. Tamim. “Literature 
Review of Performance-Based Fire Codes and Design Environment.” Journal of 
Fire Protection Engineering 9, no. 1 (February 1, 1998): 12–40. 
Hafez, Mohammed M. “Dying to Be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimension of Suicide 
Terrorism.” In Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization of Martyrdom, 
edited by Ami Pedahzur. 54–80. London: Routledge, 2006. 
Jackson, Brian A., and Dave Frelinger. Emerging Threats and Security Planning: How 
Should We Decide What Hypothetical Threats to Worry About? Santa Barbara: 
RAND, 2009. https://market.android.com/details?id=book-X60clSMyEIsC. 
Jenkins, Brian Michael. “New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts: An 
Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat.” CT-377 Testimony to Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee 11 (2013). https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=261142. 
———. The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems. Santa Barbara: RAND, 1980. 
http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA103363. 
Johansson, Nils, Patrick van Hees, and Stefan Särdqvist. “Combining Statistics and Case 
Studies to Identify and Understand Deficiencies in Fire Protection.” Fire Technology 
48, no. 4 (October 1, 2012): 945–960. 
Kahane, Allan. Fire with Fire. 1st. ed., stated ed. Westport, CT: Pyro Publishing, LLC, 
2006. 
Karapin, Roger. “Antiminority Riots in Unified Germany: Cultural Conflicts and 
Mischanneled Political Participation.” Comparative Politics 34, no. 2 (2002): 147–
167. 
 79
Khajehpour, S., and D. E. Grierson. “Profitability versus Safety of High-Rise Office 
Buildings.” Structural and Multidisciplinary Optimization 25, no. 4 (October 1, 
2003): 279–293. 
Kliot, Nurit. “Forests and Forest Fires in Israel.” International Forest Fires News, no. 15 
(1996): 2–6. 
LaMalva, Kevin J., and Morgan Hurley. “Determination of Temperature Histories for 
Analysis of Structural Response to Fire.” In Structures Congress 2015. 819–828. 
Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2015.  
Lamont, Susan, Barbara Lane, and Asif Usmani. “The Behaviour of Multi-Storey 
Composite Steel Framed Structures in Response to Compartment Fires.” Fire Safety 
Science 8 (2005): 177–188. 
Lance, Peter. 1000 Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI—The Untold 
Story. New York: HarperCollins e-books, 2009. Kindle. 
Laws, Life Safety. Sprinklers in High-Rise Buildings. Chicago: IREM, 2013. http:// 
www.irem.org/File%20Library/Public%20Policy/LifeSafety.pdf. 
Leader, Stefan H., and Peter Probst. “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental 
Terrorism.” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (2003): 37–58. http:// 
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550390449872. 
Lord, James, and Chris Marrion. “Developments in Codes around the World.” Fire 
Protection Engineering. Accessed August 13, 2017. http://www.sfpe.org/page/ 
2003_Q3_2. 
Macdonald, Stuart. “Assessing and Responding to the Cyberterrorism Threat.” In 
Terrorist Use of Cyberspace and Cyber Terrorism: New Challenges and Responses, 
edited by Mehmet Nesip Ogun. 200–209. Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press, 2015. 
Marsden, Sarah, Daiana Marino, and Gilbert Ramsay. “Forest Jihad: Assessing the 
Evidence for ‘Popular Resistance Terrorism.’” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 37, 
no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 1–17. 
Martin, Yves, Michael Klippel, Jan Gmür, and Eliott Odermatt. “Fire Safety of Timber 
Buildings under Construction—Overview of Guidelines and Recommendations.” In 
Dissemination, Standardization, and Implementation of Novel Improvements, 31. 
Ethz, Zurich, 2017. 
Michel, Lou, and Dan Herbeck. American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the 
Oklahoma City Bombing. 2nd ed. Pennsauken, NJ: BookBaby, 2015. 
Mitroff, Ian I., and Can M. Alpaslan. “National Insecurity.” In The Crisis-Prone Society: 
A Brief Guide to Managing the Beliefs That Drive Risk in Business, edited by Ian I. 
Mitroff and Can M. Alpaslan. 59–65. New York: Palgrave Pivot, 2014. 
 80
Monaghan, Rachel. “Not Quite Terrorism: Animal Rights Extremism in the United 
Kingdom.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36, no. 11 (November 1, 2013): 933–
951. 
Mostafaei, Hossein. “Hybrid Fire Testing for Assessing Performance of Structures in 
Fire—Application.” Fire Safety Journal 56 (February 1, 2013): 30–38. 
Mrena, Roderik, Rauno Pääkkönen, Leif Bäck, Ulla Pirvola, and Jukka Ylikoski. 
“Otologic Consequences of Blast Exposure: A Finnish Case Study of a Shopping 
Mall Bomb Explosion.” Acta oto-laryngologica 124, no. 8 (October 2004): 946–952. 
Musa, Musab Alamir. “Fire Safety Management System in High-Rise Building.” 
Master’s thesis. Sudan University of Science and Technology, 2016. http://reposi 
tory.sustech.edu/handle/123456789/14958. 
Neale, Robert A. “Performance-Based Design for Arson Threats: Policy Analysis of the 
Physical Security for Federal Facilities Standard.” Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2013. http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/37683. 
Ng, Yew-Kwang. “Externality.” In Welfare Economics, edited by Yew-Kwang Ng. 144–
163. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004. 
Nilsson, Martin, Nils Johansson, and Patrick Van Hees. “A New Method for Quantifying 
Fire Growth Rates Using Statistical and Empirical Data—Applied to Determine the 
Effect of Arson.” Fire Safety Science 11 (2014): 517–530. 
Nilsson, Martin, Patrick Van Hees, Håkan Frantzich, and Berit Andersson. “Analysis of 
Fire Scenarios in order to Ascertain an Acceptable Safety Level in Multi-Functional 
Buildings.” In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Performance-
Based Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods, Hong Kong, China. 20–22. Lund, 
Sweden: Lund University, 2012.  
Olson, Dean T. Tactical Counterterrorism: The Law Enforcement Manual of Terrorism 
Prevention. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 2012. 
Östman, Birgit, and Daniel Brandon. “Fire Safety Engineering--Opportunities and 
Challenges for Timber Buildings.” In World Conference on Timber Engineering 
WCTE2016, Vienna, Austria, August 22–25, 2016. Uppsala, Sweden: Digitala 
Vetenskapliga Arkivet, 2016. http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1014997/ 
FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
Panindre, Prabodh, N. S. Susan Mousavi, and Sunil Kumar. “Positive Pressure 
Ventilation for Fighting Wind-Driven High-Rise Fires: Simulation-Based Analysis 
and Optimization.” Fire Safety Journal 87 (January 1, 2017): 57–64. 
 81
Park, Dae-Kyoon, Kyung-Ho Park, Jeong-Sik Ko, Yi-Suk Kim, Nak-Eun Chung, Yong-
Woo Ahn, and Seung-Ho Han. “The Role of Forensic Anthropology in the 
Examination of the Daegu Subway Disaster (2003, Korea).” Journal of Forensic 
Sciences 54, no. 3 (May 2009): 513–518. 
Pershakov, Valerii, Andrii Bieliatynskyi, Ivanna Popovych, Katerina Lysnytska, and 
Vladimir Krasheninnikov. “Progressive Collapse of High-Rise Buildings from Fire.” 
MATEC Web of Conferences 73 (2016): 01001. 
Pigg, Larry. Elevators in Emergencies: The Firefighter’s Perspective. Phoenix, AZ: 
Knox Company, 2013. http://www.knoxbox.com/store/files/ElevatorsInEmergen 
cies_Pigg.pdf. 
Pike, John. “Napalm.” GlobalSecurity.org. Accessed August 14, 2017. http://www.global 
security.org/military/systems/munitions/napalm.htm. 
Qian-li, M. A., and Huang Ting-lin. “Analysis of and Study on the Difficulties in the Fire 
Protection Design of Large Commercial Complex.” Procedia Engineering 11 
(January 1, 2011): 302–307. 
Rashidi, Eghbal. “Optimization Models and Algorithms for Vulnerability Analysis and 
Mitigation Planning of Pyro-Terrorism.” PhD diss., Mississippi State University, 
2016. http://search.proquest.com/openview/e4113de410377537da5b4b509c14823b 
/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y. 
Raynis, Stephen A. “Improvised Incendiary Devices Risk Assessment, Threats, 
Vulnerabilities and Consequences.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2006. http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2623. 
Santtila, Pekka, Katarina Fritzon, and Anna Lena Tamelander. “Linking Arson Incidents 
on the Basis of Crime Scene Behavior.” Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology 
19, no. 1 (March 1, 2004): 1–16. 
Sapountzaki, Kalliopi, Sylvia Wanczura, Gabriella Casertano, Stefan Greiving, Gavriil 
Xanthopoulos, and Floriana F. Ferrara. “Disconnected Policies and Actors and the 
Missing Role of Spatial Planning throughout the Risk Management Cycle.” Natural 
Hazards 59, no. 3 (December 1, 2011): 1445–1474. 
Schalit, Ariel. “Wildfire Blamed on ‘Terror’ Roars through Israeli City.” AP News, 
November 24, 2016. https://apnews.com/d7a18c88fa6341b296e30c4d5b5120d4. 
Scholz, Markus, Dawud Gordon, Leonardo Ramirez, Stephan Sigg, Tobias Dyrks, and 
Michael Beigl. “A Concept for Support of Firefighter Frontline Communication.” 
Future Internet 5, no. 2 (April 16, 2013): 113–127. 
Scott, David, Barbara Lane, and Craig Gibbons. “Fire Induced Progressive Collapse.” In 
Proceedings of the Workshop on Prevention of Progressive Collapse, 10–12. 
Washington, DC: National Institute of Building Sciences, 2002. 
 82
Soule, Sarah A., and Nella Van Dyke. “Black Church Arson in the United States, 1989–
1996.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22, no. 4 (January 1, 1999): 724–742. 
Spinardi, Graham, Luke Bisby, and Jose Torero. “A Review of Sociological Issues in 
Fire Safety Regulation.” Fire Technology 53, no. 3 (2017): 1011–1037. http://link. 
springer.com/article/10.1007/s10694-016-0615-1. 
Stahel, Albert A. “Switzerland: Terrorism and Its Control.” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 4, no. 4 (December 1, 1992): 206–209. 
Starossek, Uwe. “Progressive Collapse of Structures: Nomenclature and Procedures.” 
Structural Engineering International 16, no. 2 (May 1, 2006): 113–117. 
Stein, M., and A. Hirshberg. “Medical Consequences of Terrorism. The Conventional 
Weapon Threat.” The Surgical Clinics of North America 79, no. 6 (December 1999): 
1537–1552. 
Su, Chung-Hwei, Kuang-Chung Tsai, and Mu-Yuan Xu. “Computational Analysis on the 
Performance of Smoke Exhaust Systems in Small Vestibules of High-Rise 
Buildings.” Journal of Building Performance Simulation 8, no. 4 (July 4, 2015): 
239–252. 
Sumner, David Thomas, and Lisa M. Weidman. “Eco-Terrorism or Eco-Tage: An 
Argument for the Proper Frame.” ISLE: Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and 
Environment 20, no. 4 (December 1, 2013): 855–876. 
Thorup, Mikkel. “Terror as Terror: The Return of Fear and Horror?” Borderlands 10, no. 
3 (2011): 1–22. http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA289216313&sid=g 
oogleScholar&v=2.1&it=r&linkaccess=fulltext&issn=14470810&p=AONE&sw=w. 
Townsend, Keeley, John P. Sullivan, Thomas Monahan, and John Donnelly. 
“Intelligence-Led Mitigation.” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management 7, no. 1 (January 12, 2010). https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jhsem. 
2010.7.1/jhsem.2010.7.1.1763/jhsem.2010.7.1.1763.xml. 
White, Jeffrey. “The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014.” CTC 
Sentinel 7, no. 9 (2014). http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/ 
opeds/White20140929-CTCSentinel.pdf. 
Woo, Su Jin, and Eun Kyoung Hwang. “A Study on the Evacuation Characteristics of 
Large-Span Structures Buildings.” Applied Mechanics and Materials 638–640 
(2014): 1977–1981. 
Xiu-juan, Mei. “Study on Fire Scenarios Characteristic for Subway Trunk Arson 
Simulation Test [J].” Journal of Safety Science and Technology 3 (2011). 
  
 83
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
